China has often been perceived in its engagement with Gulf countries as a sign of the United States’ decline. But J. Fulton, associate professor at Zayed University and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, argues this is misleading: while Chinese investment is growing, Beijing’s involvement remains primarily economic and driven by domestic priorities rather than geopolitical ambitions. The Gulf is important to China, he explained, “but not central to its national security.”
China’s top focus is internal — managing economic transition, reducing youth unemployment, and maintaining stability along its land and maritime borders. Regions like the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America remain secondary to these core objectives.
Why it matters: Decoding China’s growing presence in the Gulf is of strategic interest to the EU and the U.S., particularly to Rome — a country that projects part of its foreign policy ambitions and vision into the broader Middle East region.
The event: Fulton spoke at the latest ChinaMed seminar, part of an initiative by the ChinaMed Project and the Torino World Affairs Institute.
- He recently published “Building the Belt and Road Initiative in the Arab World” (Routledge), a key reference on China’s regional engagement.
- His message: understand China’s Gulf presence as part of a broader, risk-averse strategy aimed at protecting economic interests rather than projecting power.
- Echoing scholars like Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Fulton frames Beijing’s worldview as “a world of regions” — not a new Cold War.
Between economics and security. China’s activity in the Gulf remains primarily commercial.
- Beijing’s goals: deepen investment, drive technology partnerships, and strengthen its role in the energy transition. With the U.S. pulling back from renewables, Beijing sees an opening to lead.
- Yet, competition from India, Japan, and European players remains strong.
- On the security side, China’s diplomacy — highlighted by the 2022 Saudi-Iran deal and the 2023 visit of Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas — briefly boosted its image as a regional broker.
- But after the October 7 Hamas attack, Beijing’s muted response revealed its limits. China’s instinct was disengagement, Fulton noted.
- Even its much-discussed partnership with Iran shows weak substance when tested, as the relationship has often proved fragile in practice.
- Beijing has shown little willingness to support Tehran’s military engagements concretely, underscoring that its approach remains cautious and primarily economic rather than strategic.
Meanwhile, Washington is far from gone: Fulton argues that the narrative of a U.S. retreat is flawed. Recent security agreements with Qatar and potential similar talks with Saudi Arabia confirm that the region remains a vital American interest.
The bottom line: Fulton’s conclusion is clear:
- Beijing’s reluctance to extend its diplomatic reach into the security realm emerges as the main constraint on cooperation with the Gulf monarchies.
- Economically, however, China’s significance appears set to grow. Yet this rising importance should not overshadow the role of European nations or other Asian powers such as India and Japan in the region.
