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Pro-Putin forces compete for Italy’s electorate

Italy’s support for Ukraine remains official government policy. But figures ranging from former general Roberto Vannacci to emerging movements on the left are competing for voters by challenging the political consensus that has underpinned Rome’s policy since Russia’s full-scale invasion

Italy’s political consensus on Ukraine, as well as defense’s posture and budget, is facing growing pressure from both the right and the left as new political movements seek to mobilize voters skeptical of military aid, sanctions, and closer European defense cooperation ahead of the 2027 general election.

While Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government continues to back Kyiv and remains aligned with NATO and the European Union, a widening constellation of political actors is attempting to capitalize on discontent over the war and its economic consequences.

The phenomenon extends beyond the traditional political fringe and is increasingly influencing the broader electoral debate. 

Why it matters: Italy has been one of Ukraine’s most reliable European supporters under Meloni’s government.

  • Political actors on both the right and the left are seeking to mobilize voters critical of military aid, sanctions and higher defense spending.
  • The debate is increasingly shaping Italy’s domestic political landscape ahead of the 2027 election, with potential implications for European unity on Ukraine and defense. 

The big picture: Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Italy’s governing coalition has broadly maintained support for Kyiv despite internal differences.

  • That consensus is now being challenged by a growing number of political initiatives appealing to voters who oppose military assistance, question sanctions against Moscow or advocate a different relationship with Russia.
  • According to reporting by la Repubblica, more than 200 public events linked to Kremlin’s propagandistic media outlet Russia Today and other entities sanctioned by the European Union have taken place in Italy this year, underscoring a broader effort to influence the public debate. 
  • The emerging political landscape also includes new initiatives on the left, including those associated with former Five Star Movement lawmaker Alessandro Di Battista and historian Angelo d’Orsi, which seek to attract voters dissatisfied with Italy’s current foreign policy and support for Ukraine. 

Zoom in: The Vannacci issue. The most consequential figure in this evolving landscape is former army general Roberto Vannacci, now a member of the European Parliament, former vice-president of League (one of majority parties) and founder of the far-right party National Future (Futuro Nazionale).

  • A former Italian military attaché in Moscow, Vannacci has built his political profile around nationalist themes, criticism of military support for Ukraine and opposition to deeper European integration.
  • His newly created party is polling at around 6%, making it a potentially influential force within Italy’s broader right-wing bloc.
  • Unlike smaller protest movements, Vannacci combines personal electoral appeal with growing influence on Italy’s right. While he is not part of the government, his political trajectory adds pressure on parties supporting the governing coalition as they seek to defend Italy’s pro-Ukraine policy against competing narratives on Russia and European security.

Between the lines: For ECFR Rome office’s director and vice director Arturo Varvelli and Teresa Coratella, Vannacci’s emergence is significant not simply because of his domestic political ambitions but because of what it could mean for Europe.

  • They argue that his political project differs from other European nationalist parties that have attempted to distance themselves from Moscow. Instead, they see National Future as combining nationalism, Euroscepticism and positions that could complicate European coordination on sanctions, defense cooperation and support for Ukraine if its influence were to grow.
  • Their broader argument is that Europe’s mainstream parties can no longer focus only on containing political extremes. They also need to prevent increasingly radical actors from reshaping the political agenda on security, defense and relations with Russia.

What we’re watching: As Italy moves closer to the 2027 election, the key question is whether these initiatives remain fragmented or begin consolidating support among voters dissatisfied with the country’s current approach to Ukraine and European security.

  • For Italy’s mainstream parties, the challenge will be whether they can preserve the broad political consensus that has sustained support for Kyiv while responding to growing electoral pressure from movements questioning military aid, sanctions and closer European defense cooperation.

The bottom line: Italy’s support for Ukraine remains unchanged. The political contest is increasingly about the boundaries of that consensus—and whether parties and movements questioning military aid, sanctions and closer European defense cooperation can translate public discontent into lasting electoral support.

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