Donald Trump will be on the tarmac at Joint Base Andrews today to personally welcome Xi Jinping as the Chinese president arrives in Washington, an unusual gesture for a US president and the opening act of a three-day state visit in which the White House plans to give Xi a particularly elaborate reception.
The pageantry will continue on Thursday with a White House arrival ceremony, a review of troops and a black-tie state dinner attended by technology industry leaders. On Friday, Xi and his wife Peng Liyuan will return to the White House for a private tea with Trump and First Lady Melania Trump, followed by a visit to the National Archives.
Washington is seeking to reciprocate the ceremonial grandeur that greeted Trump during his visit to China in May. But behind the diplomatic choreography lies a relationship marked by deep disagreements. Trade, artificial intelligence, Iran and Taiwan hang over a summit that is not expected to produce major breakthroughs but could allow both sides to preserve a degree of “strategic stability”.
Trade first, then AI and Taiwan. For Philippe Le Corre, Professor of International Relations and Asian Studies at ESSEC, the starting point is the issue that has consistently mattered most to Trump: trade.
- “The key part is trade, as always with Trump,” Le Corre said, pointing to the role of Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent in managing the China file. “Remember that Scott Bessent is the China guy, as Marco Rubio is completely sidelined due to his previous anti-China statements.”
- Artificial intelligence could provide another area for discussion. “The AI question is also there: what about a joint regulation mechanism? But of course Washington wants to lead,” Le Corre said.
- Then there is Taiwan. Le Corre expects Xi to raise the issue once again during his talks with Trump. The US president, he noted, has been holding back an arms package for the island despite congressional approval.
Waiting for 2027? “Some analysts say the White House might wait until early 2027,” Le Corre said, pointing to Trump potentially visiting China again for Apec and Xi returning to the United States for the G20 — “if at all”.
- The possibility that Washington and Beijing could develop a bilateral mechanism for managing their differences poses a particular challenge for Europe. Stability between the world’s two largest powers is in Europe’s interest. But the calculation becomes more complicated if that stability develops into arrangements that narrow Brussels’ room for manoeuvre.
Europe’s Goldilocks problem. Noah Barkin, senior adviser on China at Rhodium Group, senior fellow in the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund and author of the “Watching China in Europe” newsletter, describes Europe’s position as a Goldilocks problem.
- “When it comes to the US and China, Europe is a little like Goldilocks. It doesn’t want relations between Washington and Beijing to become too warm. But neither does it want them too cold. The ideal temperature is somewhere in between: stability that doesn’t veer too far towards the extremes of coziness or escalation,” Barkin said.
- The timing of Xi’s visit makes that balancing act particularly delicate for Brussels.
- “At a time when the EU is considering more forceful trade measures against China, the sight of Donald Trump and Xi Jinping schmoozing it up in Washington is unsettling,” Barkin said.
European interests. That does not mean Europe has an interest in renewed economic confrontation between Washington and Beijing. Quite the opposite.
- “It is in Europe’s interest that the trade truce reached between Trump and Xi one year ago in South Korea is extended — because European companies would suffer if it wasn’t,” Barkin said. “But an open-arms embrace of Chinese investment by Trump would raise uncomfortable questions in Europe about the trajectory of US-China relations.”
- For Barkin, Europe and the United States are, despite their political differences, moving towards a similar destination in their economic relations with Beijing.
Controlled competition. “In reality, both Europe and the US are moving in the direction of a managed trade relationship with China. It would be much better for both sides if this was done in a coordinated fashion, but as long as Trump is president, this won’t happen.”
- The limits of transatlantic coordination are visible even in areas where US and European interests would appear most closely aligned.
- “Even in the area where transatlantic cooperation makes the most urgent sense, namely diversification away from China in critical minerals, progress has been underwhelming,” Barkin said.
- His conclusion is that Brussels should prepare to navigate its China relationship without assuming Washington will be alongside it.
- “Europe needs to focus on its own interests when it comes to China and not count on cooperation with the US. The hope has to be that once Trump is out of office that a more coordinated response will be possible.”
Facing a potential “G2”. Le Corre reaches a similar conclusion from a different starting point: the prospect of a US-China relationship increasingly resembling a “G2”.
- “For Europe facing this ‘G2’, the only way is an efficient, multi-circle EU with a few countries being able to decide key issues including security and defence procurement,” he said.
- Europe’s ability to respond, however, will also depend on domestic politics.
- “Obviously we have a bunch of elections in 2027 which can give us a few sleepless nights — France, Spain, Italy, not to mention what is taking place locally in Germany, weekend after weekend,” Le Corre said. “I believe Europe will come out more strongly out of this, depending on these outcomes of course.”
The common constraint is time, and Europe is not the only place where the political clock is running.
- “Remember that the clock is ticking everywhere, including in the US with the midterms, and even China, with the 21st Party Congress in just about one year,” Le Corre said.
The bottom line: Xi’s visit may therefore offer Washington and Beijing another opportunity to stabilise their competition without resolving its underlying causes.
- For Europe, the challenge will be to find the middle temperature described by Barkin while building the capacity advocated by Le Corre: avoiding a US-China escalation that would directly damage European interests, without relying on a degree of transatlantic coordination that, for now, appears out of reach.
