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Europe is spending more on defense. Now it has to turn money into capabilities

Europe’s defense spending is increasing, reaching €418 billion in 2025 and potentially rising to €547 billion by 2029. However, the challenge lies in converting this investment into operational and interoperable capabilities, as much of the spending remains national and fragmented. The European Defence Agency (EDA) aims to address this through the Annual Defence Readiness Report and the Card cycle, promoting cooperation and convergence among member states to develop integrated capabilities. An interview with Stefano Cont, director of the Capability

Europe’s defense spending is reaching levels unseen in decades, but turning higher budgets into operational and interoperable capabilities remains the next challenge.

Stefano Cont, director of the Capability, armament and planning division at the European defence agency, explains how the first Annual defence readiness report and the next Card cycle are meant to help member states move from investment to greater cooperation.

Why it matters: Eu defense expenditure reached €418 billion in 2025 and could rise to €547 billion by 2029. But much of that investment is still organized nationally.

Airpress, Decode39’s sister magazine focused on aerospace and defense, spoke with Cont about how Europe can reduce fragmentation, improve interoperability and make better use of the resources now flowing into defense.

Q: General Cont, what overall picture emerges from the first Annual defence readiness report, and what are the main challenges that still need to be addressed?

A: The document is intended for governments and is not public, although many of the quantitative figures it uses are already available through Eda publications.

  • The report brings together capability development, industry, cooperation with third countries — particularly Ukraine — and the more technical and operational aspects linked to capability shortfalls. Its aim is to provide an overall picture of progress toward Readiness 2030.
  • On spending, Eu member states have reached levels unseen in the past thirty years. Defense expenditure reached €418 billion in 2025, equivalent to 2.2% of Eu Gdp, and could rise to €547 billion by 2029.
  • That is a major opportunity, but the challenge is to ensure that higher investment also reduces fragmentation and produces more interoperable capabilities. A significant share of investment is still carried out nationally, and cooperation has not yet reached the level we would like to see.
  • The question is therefore not only how much we spend, but how we turn those resources into real capabilities.
  • Each country has its own priorities, often urgent ones, but in some areas cooperation is no longer simply desirable, it is essential. Strategic transport, air-to-air refueling, space capabilities, integrated command and control, C4ISTAR and integrated missile defense are examples of capabilities that are difficult for a single country to develop alone.
  • The European Commission’s instruments, from research and development to procurement and industrial development, are also designed to encourage greater cooperation among states and industries.

Q: How does the Readiness report relate to Card, and what different roles do the two instruments play?

A: They have different purposes and audiences.

  • The Readiness report is meant to give heads of state and government a 360-degree view of where Europe stands, covering the political, industrial, capability and operational dimensions.
  • Card has a stronger defense focus and is developed with the participation and guidance of defense ministers. The next report will take into account both the Readiness Report and the guidance coming from heads of state and government.
  • Its objective is to encourage greater convergence among national defense planning processes and turn shared priorities into concrete opportunities for cooperation.
  • The difference is that we move from the snapshot to the operational phase: not only understanding where we stand, but identifying what needs to be done next and how to do it.
  • That means working with defense ministries, general staffs and armed forces to identify concrete steps, possible forms of cooperation and the capabilities that need to be developed.

Q: Defense spending is rising rapidly, but operational capabilities are not increasing at the same pace. Why does that gap remain?

A: Because a military capability is not simply the purchase of a system.

  • In previous years, attention focused heavily on the material component, partly because years of underspending had created shortfalls in many essential systems. But real readiness requires looking at the capability as a whole.
  • The reference is the DOTMLPF-I model, also used by Nato. Having the platform or the “piece of metal” is not enough. You also need doctrine, organization, training and personnel.
  • Recruitment and retention, for example, are major issues. These elements are what turn a system into a genuinely usable military capability.
  • There is also significant room for optimization. Europe still has many duplications in training centers and other structures, which absorb resources and reduce the effectiveness of investment.
  • Even buying the same equipment would not be enough if logistics, infrastructure, training and education continued to be organized mainly at national level.
  • The challenge is therefore not only to spend more, but to spend better and, wherever possible, together.
  • Greater convergence can reduce fragmentation, generate economies of scale and improve interoperability among European armed forces. This is the logic behind “pooling and sharing,” applied not only to systems but also to the structures needed to operate them.

Q: Fragmentation ultimately depends on member states. What can the EDA concretely do to encourage greater integration?

A: One of the main areas of our work is the harmonization of requirements and needs.

  • So far, this has mainly concerned the material side. If we harmonize only the requirement for a tank or an artillery system, we may eventually reach the joint procurement of the same product. The next step is to extend this harmonization to training and education requirements as well.
  • We are not starting from zero. User groups have already been created among countries operating the same systems, allowing them to share training, logistics and spare parts.
  • The objective now is to develop that approach more systematically. If we want integrated capabilities, the other components that make them operational must also be integrated.
  • The Eda can see what member states operate, what their needs are and which programs they are planning. By bringing this information together, we can promote common activities and help reduce fragmentation.

The bottom line: “Our added value is to bring together states with similar needs, encourage convergence as early as possible and turn common requirements into concrete opportunities for cooperation before national decisions make that more difficult,” said Mr Cont.

  • “At the same time, the Eda is an intergovernmental agency and works on the basis of mandates from member states. Card will therefore be important in identifying opportunities for cooperation not only on equipment, but also across the other elements needed to build a real capability.”

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