What’s happened. According to Bulgarian authorities, the European Commission confirmed GPS interference and attributed it to a “blatant interference” linked to Russia.
- The aircraft landed safely. Moscow denied involvement, while Bulgarian Interior Minister Daniel Mitov ruled out a cyberattack in the strict sense, describing it instead as radio-frequency jamming.
- The incident occurred during the Commission President’s four-day tour of the Eastern Flank countries.
- Brussels ties the episode to the broader context of hybrid threats (Italy is among the targets) and announced plans to strengthen European capabilities, including deploying additional low-orbit satellites.
The big picture. The Plovdiv case is not isolated. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, jamming and spoofing incidents have multiplied across Europe, affecting the Baltic, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and Arctic.
- In 2024, a RAF aircraft carrying Grant Shapps, then UK Defence Secretary, and two Finnair flights were disrupted.
- The phenomenon targets both government and commercial flights and underscores how electronic warfare has become integral to hybrid threats: radio interference that does not breach onboard systems yet can undermine the safety and continuity of air traffic.
- In this context, resilience is crucial for states and institutions alike.
What’s jamming?
“Jamming” refers to the blocking of GNSS signals through stronger radio-frequency emissions than those transmitted by satellites.
- “Spoofing” involves falsifying signals, deceiving receivers with erroneous position or timing data.
- EASA reports a surge in such incidents near sensitive and conflict-prone areas and recommends using alternative navigation systems. In Plovdiv, terrestrial navigation allowed a safe landing.
By the numbers:
- Spoofing affected 1,500 flights per day in Europe during specific periods of 2024.
- 41,000 flights disrupted in a single month (July–August 2024).
- 38% of European air traffic in 2025 crosses zones intermittently affected by GNSS interference (Eurocontrol).
The risks. This phenomenon affects critical infrastructure: onboard systems (navigation, communications, and safety) heavily rely on GNSS.
- Low-intensity electronic warfare has become a tool of strategic pressure—without the need to “hack” anything.
The expert’s take. “The safe landing in Plovdiv shows that aviation safety barriers worked, but the episode highlights how electronic warfare, even without hacking, can create real risks and strategic pressure on the EU’s eastern borders,” Antonio Teti, professor at the University “G. D’Annunzio” of Chieti-Pescara, explained to Decode39.
- “Awareness is key: pilots must distinguish spoofing from jamming and swiftly switch to terrestrial navigation.”
- The European response must combine technical measures (resilience and training) with political tools (deterrence, sanctions, space situational awareness).
- “Politically, the EU has already sanctioned entities involved in signal interference and is working on a dedicated plan for aviation. Brussels cites the Plovdiv incident as further evidence of the need to enhance defence and surveillance capabilities,” said Teti. He is also a consultant to Italy’s National Cybersecurity Agency (ACN).
The Italian response. While the EU is preparing a reinforcement plan, with more low-orbit satellites to detect interference and enhance resilience, Italy is considering extending shielding measures for official flights, already tested on the Airbus used by Giorgia Meloni after her trip to Mar-a-Lago.
- The plan would remove public traceability of government aircraft routes, following models adopted in Germany and other EU countries, to reduce the risk of interference and protect travel by political and institutional leaders.
- The move comes amid intense cyber pressure: in the first eight months of 2025, Italy recorded more than 18,000 attempted intrusions — almost double the previous year — mainly targeting ministries, healthcare and the Defence sector.
