On April 11, 2026, four American astronauts returned safely from space as part of the Artemis II mission. They were the first human crew to do so in over 50 years (the last mission of this kind was in 1973). The mission’s success was a symbolic triumph for the US, but in Washington, among the analysts who matter, the relief was short-lived.
Deep anxiety persists among the security apparatus over China’s progress in space. New American research reveals that the real space race of the twenty-first century won’t be fought, or won, on the Moon, but in the factories.
What matters isn’t space itself so much as industry. And on this front, Beijing is making rapid, alarming advances. In the background of all this sits a slow, almost motionless Europe. While the United States and China fight out of fear of finishing second, Europe hasn’t even entered the race.
China’s industrial space surge. What worries Washington’s analysts most is the powerful industrial base the Chinese government is building in the space sector. Using a combination of state investment and private capital, China is rapidly creating a significant manufacturing capacity that could rival America’s in the near future. In 2014, the year Xi Jinping authorized private investment in the space industry with “Document 60,” China had fewer than a dozen active companies in the commercial space sector.
- The American think tank CSIS now estimates that figure has grown to roughly 600 companies. The same study’s authors calculate that this new Chinese industry can now produce between 4,000 and 5,000 satellites per year, spread across 17 industrial facilities, each larger than the last.
- According to excerpts from a Chinese trade-focused blog analyzed by CSIS, current production capacity stands at 4,050 per year across 36 facilities, with an additional increase of 3,310 per year planned for the near future, for a projected total capacity of 7,360 per year. In 2024, the US government itself, in its annual threat assessment released by the heads of the American intelligence community, wrote that Beijing is on track to become one of the world’s leading competitors in this domain by 2030.
The main strength of the government’s approach is the same interplay between the private and public sectors that allowed China to become a global power in shipbuilding, 5G telecommunications, and drones. Companies retain their private ownership structure, but in practice operate as, and become, quasi-public enterprises.
- These firms become fully aligned with state policy, folded into provincial development plans, new “aerospace cities,” and technology hubs. This isn’t limited to existing facilities: the government is planning further expansions and projects that also factor in these private companies. The Chinese Communist Party is therefore willing to tolerate any inefficiency and overcapacity resulting from this approach, as long as it guarantees speed and market dominance.
Space as dual-use infrastructure. China is also building infrastructure explicitly intended for both military and economic purposes. This “dual-use” strategy shows that, much like the original space race, this isn’t simply a scientific undertaking, but rather a way for Xi to spur economic growth, technological self-sufficiency, military modernization, and the expansion of his country’s geopolitical influence.
- A clear example of this is the government’s push behind two initiatives: the “Thousand Sails” project and the “Guowang” project, led respectively by Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology and China SatNet. Both programs, run by Chinese state-owned enterprises, consist of satellite networks aiming to reach over 10,000 satellites and rival Starlink. Although no Chinese company has yet recovered or reused a rocket, and the Thousand Sails project has suffered in-orbit failures and delays, China is unlikely to deviate from this trajectory.
- Its commitment to building this dual-use infrastructure is firm, and the country certainly has sufficient resources to see these ambitious programs through. All of this confirms the reality of this new space race and Xi Jinping’s and his party’s political will to do everything possible not to lose it.
Europe’s widening gap. This raises a question, then: what role does Europe play in all this? While Beijing and Washington go head to head in this new, fierce space race, Europe hasn’t even entered the competition. The clearest example is the EU’s IRIS² program, meant to become the Union’s sovereign, secure connectivity constellation. The program was supposed to deliver a global service by 2027, with first launches planned for 2025.
- However, at the 2026 European Space Conference, the timeline was pushed back. First launches will now happen only in 2029, with government services expected to begin in 2029 or 2030, and full operational capability not reached until 2031 or 2032.
- This is a staggeringly slow pace, and the scale of the gap between Chinese and European effort and resolve becomes fully clear only when comparing China’s ambition of over 10,000 satellites per single project (meaning a minimum of 20,000 satellites in total) with IRIS²’s modest stated goal of 290 satellites.
- While the two projects differ in nature, it’s hard to ignore how much faster China is advancing toward its ambitious targets compared to Europe, which is struggling to launch a fraction of that number within a decade of the project’s start.
Europe’s role in the emerging space landscape. This raises a broader question about Europe’s position in the evolving space economy. While Beijing and Washington are clearly leading the current race, Europe is participating in a more gradual and institutionally complex way, with efforts that reflect its distinctive governance model.
- The EU’s IRIS² program, designed to become a sovereign secure connectivity constellation, illustrates both the ambition and the challenges of this approach. Initially planned to deliver global services by 2027 with first launches in 2025, the timeline was later adjusted at the 2026 European Space Conference, with launches now expected in 2029 and full operational capability projected for the early 2030s.
- The program’s target of around 290 satellites is modest compared to the scale of US and Chinese megaconstellations, but it reflects a different strategic intent focused on resilience, sovereignty, and institutional balance rather than sheer volume.
The bottom line: The problem, then, is one of vision and coordination. While China measures its success in factories and production capacity, and the United States, despite the triumph of Artemis II and the concrete plans of the new Artemis program, remains focused on the challenge of keeping pace with Beijing’s rapid advances, Europe continues to measure its progress in treaties, draft legislation, and conferences.
- The question the CSIS report poses to Washington, of whether the United States is moving fast enough to compete with Beijing, is increasingly central to the global debate on space leadership. In a race where the winner isn’t the one who invents the most, but the one who builds the most, and fastest, the balance of power is shifting toward those able to scale industrial production.
- This dynamic will likely define the next phase of competition, as the arena of great-power rivalry, both economic and military, extends further from Earth into space.
