The survey: The findings come from “How Trump is making China great again—and what it means for Europe,” ECFR’s latest global opinion poll.
- Conducted in November 2025, one year after the re-election of Donald Trump.
- Based on 25,949 respondents across 21 countries, including the US, China, Russia, India, Türkiye, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and 13 EU member states.
- The project was carried out in cooperation with Oxford University’s Europe in a Changing World initiative.
In Italy, the survey was conducted among 1,501 respondents between 5 and 19 November 2025, as part of the EU sample.
Why it matters: Across the EU — including countries like Italy — public opinion is adjusting to a reality in which American leadership is seen as less reliable, China’s rise appears inevitable, and Europe is forced to confront its own strategic fragility. These perceptions shape domestic debates on defence spending, strategic autonomy, and Europe’s global role.
China’s rise looks inevitable — and largely unthreatening. Across major middle powers, respondents expect China’s already significant global influence to grow further over the next decade. This view is strongest in South Africa (83%), Brazil (72%), and Türkiye (63%).
- Within the EU, a majority believes China will become the global leader in electric vehicle manufacturing and renewable energy technologies over the next 10 years — a perception that has strengthened over the past 2 years.
- In several countries, China is widely seen as a necessary partner or ally: South Africa (85%), Russia (86%), and Brazil (73%). While many respondents acknowledge Beijing’s growing geopolitical weight and leadership in innovative sectors, few appear to fear this trajectory. Only in Ukraine (55%) and South Korea (51%) does a majority see China as a rival or adversary.
- Elsewhere, expectations point to closer future ties with Beijing, including in South Africa (71%), Brazil (52%), Russia (46%), and Türkiye (46%).
The US remains influential — but its appeal is fading. Most respondents do not expect the United States to disappear as a global power. The US is still widely regarded as influential and likely to remain so.
- That said, in China (34%), the EU (37%), Ukraine (32%), and even in the United States itself (43%), there is no majority expecting American influence to grow further over the next decade.
- Roughly one in four respondents in China, Russia, Ukraine, and the US anticipates a decline in US global influence. Within the EU, the shift is particularly stark: only 16% of EU citizens now consider the US an ally, while 20% see it as a rival or an enemy.
- Elsewhere, perceptions of America are not collapsing outright, but they are steadily deteriorating. As views of China improve, the US has lost ground as a preferred ally almost everywhere surveyed. India stands out as a partial exception, with similar shares of respondents viewing the US (54%) and Russia (46%) as allies.
Trump’s re-election inspires less confidence than before. Across most countries, expectations toward Trump have been scaled back. Compared with a year earlier, fewer respondents now believe that his re-election has been positive for American citizens, their own countries, or global peace.
- In India, for example, the share of respondents who viewed Trump’s victory as good for their country fell sharply from 84% at the end of 2024 to 53%. In several countries, sentiment has shifted from broad approval to marked criticism.
- At the same time, sizeable minorities in India (63%), Türkiye (50%), China (46%), and Ukraine (43%) agree that Trump has at least succeeded in defending US interests on the global stage.
Europe is increasingly seen as a central antagonist — or anchor. As global power balances shift, perceptions of Europe are also changing, sometimes sharply. The most dramatic change appears in Russia, where a majority of respondents now view Europe as an adversary (51%), up from 42% a year earlier.
- At the same time, Russia’s view of the US has softened, as the Trump administration has sought to repair relations with Vladimir Putin. Only 37% of Russians now consider the US an adversary, down from 48% last year and 64% two years ago.
- The inverse dynamic is visible in Ukraine. Ukrainians who once saw Washington as their main ally now look primarily to Europe for support. Nearly two-thirds (62%) expect Ukraine’s relationship with the EU to strengthen, compared with 37% who say the same about the US. While 39% of Ukrainians see the EU as an ally, only 18% say so about the US.
- Perceptions of Washington as an ally have declined markedly over the past year, while views of the EU have remained comparatively stable.
China now sees Europe as a distinct pole. Chinese perceptions of Europe are also shifting. Asked whether EU policies toward China are similar to those of the US, a majority of Chinese respondents (55%) now say they are different. In previous years, most had seen them as similar.
- This distinction matters: while 61% of Chinese respondents view the US as a threat, only 19% view the EU as a threat. This does not reflect indifference toward Europe. On the contrary, China is one of the few countries where a majority (59%) considers the EU a great power.
- Europe is increasingly seen as a partner (46%), while the US is viewed primarily as a rival (45). In Beijing’s public perception, Europe has emerged as a separate pole in a genuinely multipolar world no longer dominated by America.
Americans’ view of Europe remains broadly stable. Despite Trump’s rhetoric, American public opinion on Europe has not fundamentally shifted.
- The prevailing view in the US (40%) remains that the EU is an ally. Nearly half of Americans (49%) agree that “European security is also American security,” while only 29% disagree. More than half (54%) see Russia’s war against Ukraine as a threat to US security.
Europeans are pessimistic — and increasingly security-minded. Europeans stand out globally for their pessimism about the future. Nearly half doubt that the years ahead will bring positive outcomes for their own countries (49%) or for the world as a whole (51%).
- A plurality of EU citizens (46%) does not believe the EU is strong enough to negotiate on equal terms with either the US or China — a share that has increased from 42% in 2024.
- Hostile rhetoric toward Europe from Trump and Putin may contribute to this perception, especially as populist and nationalist parties across the continent echo it.
- At the same time, Europeans express acute security concerns: fear of Russian aggression (40%), a major European war (55%), and the use of nuclear weapons (57%). These anxieties translate into policy preferences, with strong support across the EU for higher defence spending (52%), the reintroduction of conscription (45%), and even the development of a European nuclear deterrent (47%).
What the authors are saying:
- Ivan Krastev, Chair at Centre for Liberal Strategies:
- “The division of the West is felt most acutely in Europe, and in how others perceive Europe. For European policymakers, the challenge now is how to live in a truly multipolar world — one that many Europeans had long imagined, but are now beginning to fear.”
- Mark Leonard, ECFR’s Director:
- “This survey shows that the world believes the West is dead. Europeans no longer see America as an ally. Ukrainians now look to Brussels rather than Washington for support, and Russians see Europe — not America — as their greatest enemy. Trump’s campaign to put America first has made it less popular among its allies and has helped put China in pole position”.
- Timothy Garton Ash, historian:
- “Europeans are finally opening their eyes to the harsh reality of a post-Western world. Realising that they can no longer rely on the United States for their security, on China for their prosperity, or on Russia for their energy supplies, they are asking — and doubting — whether they can rely on themselves”.
