As Donald Trump announces on Truth Social an “energy truce” between Russia and Ukraine, air and maritime incidents involving Russian assets are multiplying along NATO’s eastern flank. Coincidence or strategy? Decode39 put the question to Gen. Vincenzo Camporini, who argues that the latest episodes should not be viewed in isolation, but rather as part of a pattern of Russian pressure that has been building for months.
Q: Once again, a drone coming from Russia has violated European airspace. An Italian Air Force fighter jet was scrambled in response. Do you think that was a disproportionate and inefficient response, particularly in terms of cost?
A: Let’s start with what we mean by a drone. A Global Hawk flying at 70,000 feet and Mach 0.8 is a drone. A quadcopter that costs €1,000 at a supermarket — or one modified to carry a bomb — is also a drone, travelling at 60 kilometres per hour, 50 metres above the ground. When we use the word “drone”, in naval terms we are talking about a category that ranges from an inflatable boat to an aircraft carrier.
- In this particular case, I do not know what type of drone was intercepted. But in that theatre of operations there are jet-powered drones capable of travelling at around 650 kilometres per hour and carrying a significant payload. Against that kind of target, deploying a sophisticated aircraft such as a Eurofighter interceptor is not at all unreasonable.
Q: The incident occurred at roughly the same time as two flares fired from a Russian frigate came close to hitting a Danish helicopter. It is easy to see a common thread between the two episodes — and perhaps a Kremlin increasingly willing to push the boundaries.
A: Since this crisis began in February 2022, we have seen a series of actions that can be interpreted as a continuous effort to test the operational response capabilities of NATO forces.
- They are also testing the political response, because it is obvious that Russia would be extremely pleased to see fragmentation within the Western coalition — whether inside NATO, the European Union, or in any other form — which Moscow regards as a dangerous adversary.
Q: Is there an effective way to counter this Russian approach beyond responding to individual incidents and issuing statements?
A: I would not use the word “attempts”, because what we are dealing with is a systematic approach that employs a wide range of instruments, from disinformation campaigns and cyber operations to activity on social media and other forms of interference, the most recent example of which we saw in Leipzig.
- There is a Russian determination to keep tensions high and put our governments under pressure, evidently in the hope — from Moscow’s perspective — of undermining solidarity. So far, there have been operational responses. The problem, of course, is one of responsiveness precisely because this hybrid warfare campaign is so diversified, and the response therefore has to be equally diversified.
- I see nothing strange or particularly new in this. What I do see is a worrying posture from Moscow, which apparently wants to keep tensions high. And when tensions remain this high, there is always a risk that a serious incident may occur.
Q: Over the past few months, similar incidents have tended to occur when there has been renewed momentum in the negotiating process. It is difficult to believe that this is purely coincidental.
A: Moscow’s posture has become progressively more assertive as Trump’s “accommodating” attitude — to use a euphemism — towards the Ukraine issue has become increasingly evident.
- On the one hand, Putin clearly feels relatively confident about the potential American response. On the other, a Europe that is gradually being left to fend for itself becomes a target from a political perspective even before it does from an operational one. I think that is quite significant.
- As for the fact that negotiations are currently being discussed, we are following developments very closely. But we should also recognise that Moscow continues to repeat exactly what it was saying at the beginning of this crisis, when it invaded Ukraine. Its objectives have not changed: they still involve taking control of Ukrainian territories well beyond those that Russian forces have so far managed to conquer.
Q: Knowing that elections in Europe over the coming months could create a much more favourable environment for him to negotiate a political settlement, is it reasonable to think that Putin is deliberately seeking to keep negotiations in a state of limbo?
A: The scenario you describe is entirely credible. The cohesion of the coalition of the willing depends on the positions taken by individual governments.
- The governments of the main countries in this coalition are either going through periods of fragility, as in Germany, or may change as a result of elections, as in France and Italy. It is therefore clear that Russia has every interest in delaying any potential negotiations, probably because it expects the political climate to become more favourable over the coming months.
Q: Yesterday, Trump announced an “energy truce” under which both sides in the conflict would commit not to attack energy infrastructure, including oil facilities and power plants. Who stands to benefit most from such a truce? And how credible is the prospect that both sides would actually respect it?
A: I think a truce of this kind would benefit both sides. Ukraine is certainly facing another particularly difficult winter because of the attacks on its energy infrastructure, which Russia has demonstrated its ability to overwhelm in previous years.
- Russia, for its part, clearly has a problem when it comes to managing its oil and energy resources and processing them into usable products. And then there is Trump, who evidently sees the world through the prism of the automobile. I drive a diesel, and perhaps he is worried about filling up his own car as well.
