Hybrid threats • Politics • Technology and Security

Picierno: China and Russia share the same contempt for freedom

From the reversal over the Russian Film Festival to relations with Beijing, Pina Picierno identifies a common thread in the strategy of autocracies to influence the West. The leader of Spazio Pubblico denounces the ambiguities of Italian politics, calls on the government to adopt a preventive strategy against foreign interference, and urges Europe to take a more decisive role in defending democracy

Moscow’s war against Europe is not being fought only in Ukraine. It also extends to cinemas, festivals, conferences, and cultural initiatives that, under the guise of pluralism, seek to legitimise the Kremlin’s narrative.

For Pina Picierno, leader of Spazio Pubblico and Vice-President of the European Parliament, the cancellation of the Russian Film Festival in Rome represents a victory for democracy, but certainly not the end of the struggle. The front of hybrid warfare is expanding, bringing Beijing into the picture as well. Despite the profound differences between China and Russia, Beijing shares with the Russian regime a contempt for freedoms and an increasingly convergent strategic outlook.

The issue, therefore, is not merely cultural, but political and geopolitical. It also concerns Italy, which must assess its own consistency in dealing with authoritarian powers. Hence, according to Picierno, the urgency of a Europe that is less hesitant and better equipped to defend its democracies against propaganda, disinformation, and foreign interference.

Q: Following your letter to Meloni, Giuli and Piantedosi, the organisers of the Russian Film Festival scheduled to take place in Rome announced its cancellation, citing the climate of opposition and the risk of protests. Do you consider this outcome a victory? And, above all, has a propaganda operation been stopped, or has it merely been prevented from taking place on this occasion?

A: It was a victory for culture, freedom, democracy, and for those who still have faith and refuse to be intimidated. And those who conceived the festival would do well to understand this: people’s consciences are more vigilant than the public debate manages to convey.

  • The stage, as on many previous occasions, was not serving the artistic expression of a culture, a country, or a language, but propaganda operations devised in the rooms of the Kremlin, under the watchful direction of its autocrat.
  • Admirers of Russian realism had nothing to do with it, just as lovers of classical music had nothing to do with it in the case of Gergiev. What was involved, instead, was the objective of influencing European public opinion through regime parades staged in the squares of our cities. Mine was yet another battle for truth and freedom, not censorship.
  • Those with short memories who promptly take the lectern in the name of freedom of expression should be reminded — and this is no incidental reminder — that in Russia, cinema, like every other form of art and culture, is subjected to the Kremlin’s strict censorship, and that a significant number of directors have had to endure imprisonment, exile, and state boycotts.
  • To accommodate regimes means, beyond any doubt, to accommodate their totalitarian horrors against freedoms and against free women and men.

Q: You directly called upon three government authorities: the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Culture, and the Ministry of the Interior. Does the organisers’ decision to cancel the festival close the matter, or do you now expect the government to take responsibility? And how do you assess the fact that this outcome was achieved only after your public initiative, rather than through a preventive position taken by the institutions?

A: The cancellation closes this episode, not the issue. On matters of national security, solid institutional cooperation has been built over time with Giorgia Meloni: this time too, as on other similar occasions, I found her willing to listen and attentive.

  • That is how it should be, because when the security of the Republic is at stake, party affiliations come after the common duty towards the State, and on my part this loyalty has never been lacking and never will be.
  • This does not erase the political fact, which I indeed claim: the result came because I chose to remove the issue from indifference and to call the institutions to account, taking full responsibility for doing so.
  • The fact that a public initiative was necessary, rather than a preventive position, is not due to technical or regulatory reasons, but purely political ones: Italian politics as a whole still lacks the courage to address the defence of democracy with the seriousness and urgency it requires.
  • Cyberattacks carry as much weight as attacks on physical infrastructure, disinformation campaigns as much as regime propaganda: let us not be deceived by their different intensity; they are parts of the same hybrid war.
  • For this reason, the assumption of responsibility I expect from the government is to make prevention a method, because we cannot start from scratch every single time.
  • And for this reason, it is no minor detail that a leading member of the executive has displayed a Putin T-shirt: every public appearance by Salvini risks compromising the credibility of the entire government and undermining our joint efforts.

Q: On the same day, Carlo Calenda criticised the November 26 event at the Caffè Letterario, referring to professors and former ambassadors “at the court of a fascist dictator”, while Azione announced a demonstration. Can the opposition parties present a united front on this issue, or do their tones and methods — demonstrations, public denunciations, letters to ministers — remain different? And is there not a risk that the controversy will give visibility to those seeking it?

A: In Italy there are two oppositions to the government. One, the centrist opposition, makes the defence of democracy and support for Ukraine its defining characteristic.

  • The other has already been immortalised in Giuseppe Conte’s unseemly postures regarding Russian aggression: he is the one who dominates that camp, in foreign policy as in its programme, in its stance as in its vision.
  • No, there can be no unity: our gaze is directed towards freedom and Europe, theirs predominantly towards their own navel.
  • I am naturally grateful to those who have shown sensitivity and firmness in their public statements; however, if those words are not followed by consistent political conduct, they remain personal statements, valuable but destined to remain just that.

Q: You speak of an “operation of normalisation”. The November 26 conference is entitled “Russia, the Imaginary Enemy of a Declining West” and includes welcoming remarks by Ambassador Paramonov. Cinema on the one hand, books and debate on the other: is this the same soft-power playbook, and does it work because it presents itself as culture?

A: It is the same playbook, but it does not fall within the category of soft power: we are far removed from the distinction Joseph Nye proposed in the early 1990s.

  • Here there is no power of persuasion, nor cultural hegemony as opposed to the use of force: there is domination, the will to power, armed and cultural aggression, all part of a single whole orchestrated within the ideological framework of a return to great fatherlands.
  • And to great dictators. In this score, the discordant note is Europe: its integration, its peaceful coexistence, its social model, its respect for international law. These are the things I defend tooth and nail: not when it is too late, but now. As I have already demonstrated.

Q: Meanwhile, Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun is in Italy. He has met with Crosetto and is today in Brindisi aboard a Fincantieri vessel, while the President of the Apulia Region, Decaro, is preparing a mission to Beijing. How can a tough stance towards Moscow be reconciled with an opening towards a China that is increasingly close to Russia?

A: We must recover both the ability to distinguish differences and the ability to grasp common points. We are talking about two very different regimes in terms of economic conditions, productive capacity, the complexity of their systems, and their vision of international relations, but underlying both is the same contempt for freedoms.

  • We do not support Ukraine merely because of geographical proximity or friendship: we support it above all because, if the principle of military aggression as a method for changing borders and sovereignty were to prevail, the domino effect would engulf the entire world.
  • It is easy to imagine that, at that point, a licence would be granted to any ambition for domination, whether global or regional. And it is a licence we cannot grant: today to Russia, tomorrow to China, the day after tomorrow to who knows whom.

Q: You point out that the Kremlin has been conducting a campaign of influence and destabilisation against Europe for years. What can and should the European Parliament do, beyond submitting parliamentary questions? And how can a democracy defend itself without slipping into censorship or ending up regarding every form of dialogue with suspicion?

A: The European Democracy Shield is producing results, but they are still far too limited. The guidance provided to governments is valuable; now we need to accelerate and pool our tools.

  • We are clearly paying the price for the cumbersome functioning of our institutions and legislative process, which would require a new and stronger Maastricht; in the meantime, however, more and better can be done, even without reforming the treaties.
  • The SAFE method is moving in the right direction: we can and must extend it, with new resources and dedicated programmes, to the various areas of the continent’s security.
  • We are facing an extremely delicate electoral cycle, ahead of which repeated attempts at influence and interference are already evident: we cannot allow any agent to take the place of citizens’ free choice.

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