The EverGiven blockage of the Suez Canal and Russia’sinvasion of Ukraine should have triggered a lasting shift in how Italian firms assess chokepoint vulnerabilities and single supplier dependencies. They did not. As tensions in the Gulfescalated and the Strait of Hormuz was eventually closed, many businesses found themselves exposed in all too familiarways.
This is particularly striking because the disruption was not unforeseen, much less unforeseeable. In virtually everyserious scenario modeling of a regional conflict involving Iran, the closure of Hormuz and attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure rank among the most immediate consequences, and both have now materialized. Signals had been accumulating for months. Already three months ago, rhetoric from Washington and Tel Aviv had hardened, reflecting a growing perception that Iran was in an unusually weakened position and that a decisive move might be viable. One month ago, the scale of US military deployments in the region had reached levels comparable only to the prelude to the 2003 Iraq invasion. Roughly one-third of all active U.S. naval assets were en route or deployed in the region, including two Carrier Strike Groups. Taken together, these indicators pointed not to a remote contingency, but to a realistic and increasingly likely disruption.
The situation is as fluid as ever. The US decided Wednesdayto deploy some 3000 paratroopers to the region, in addition to a similar number of US Marines due to arrive Friday from the Pacific, a move that may signal preparedness for limited amphibious operations. Potential objectives could include targeted operations on Kharg Island, Iran’s critical oil export terminal, or attempts to secure key coastal nodes near the Strait. The latter appears less likely given the limited size of the contingent and the operational complexity of holding territory in such a contested environment. Even in the case of Kharg, any operation would likely be easy to initiate and hard to maintain. The lesson from comparable cases is clear: taking an island is one thing, holding it is another. Beyond the immediate military calculus, such operations are unlikely to grant a sudden resumption of trade. The immediate consequence would probably be a further increase in riskpremiums across the region and a rise in the likelihood of retaliatory, asymmetric measures affecting broader maritime traffic, such as mines and drones.
Hormuz’s economic impact extends well beyond oil and gas.The region’s industrial output also flows through this corridor, accounting for over 10% of global ethylene capacity, the foundational chemical for ubiquitous plastics like polyethylene. More than 30 plastics suppliers, most of them in Asia and unable to secure production inputs, have invoked force majeure on their contracts. Furthermore, the Strait serves as the primary exit point for nearly one-third of the global helium supply, a non-renewable resource essential for MRI scanners and semiconductor manufacturing. Agricultural stability is equally linked to the passage, as it carries millions of metric tons of nitrogenous fertilizers such as urea and ammonia to international markets.
Disruptions will ripple across entire industrial chains. Prices have reacted accordingly. They rise quickly in response to shocks but decline only slowly as uncertainty persists, and market actors continue to price in risk. On top of economic dynamics, O&G engineers warn that a return to full production will take between 4 and 7 weeks after such a prolonged “shut-in” of wells. Volatility is the only certainty, and even sectors that are not directly energy-intensive are exposed through input costs, logistics, and downstream demand.
This is yet another episode that makes clear that chokepoints are no longer remote risks. Maritime corridors, critical inputs, and energy infrastructure are increasingly exposed to geopolitical leverage. For firms, the question is not whether disruption will occur, but how frequently and how severely. For a small Italian SME, the starting point can be to begin mapping exposure. Identifying key suppliers, understanding where critical inputs transit, and monitoring a limited set of high-impact geographies such as the Gulf, the Red Sea, or the Taiwan Strait can already provide a first layer of resilience. Even a basic awareness of where vulnerabilities lie is often enough to anticipate delays, adjust inventories, or diversify sourcing before disruptions fully materialize.
Italian SMEs operate under structural constraints. Limited margins, both financial and managerial, reduce their capacity to access high–quality analysis. In this industrial environment, business associations can play a pivotal role. By pooling resources, they can provide members with targeted and sector-specific insight that is both more affordable and more relevant than generic information streams.
At the same time, access to dedicated geopolitical expertiseintroduces a form of competitive advantage. In an environment saturated with open-source information, recycled commentary, and low–value analysis, true expertise, humannetworks, and on-the-ground knowledge are the only factors that provide a real advantage.
