Hybrid warfare is no longer a threat looming on the horizon. It has become a structural feature of geopolitical competition.
Cyberattacks, sabotage, drones, economic pressure, the weaponization of migration and, above all, disinformation have become regular tools through which hostile actors seek to penetrate European societies and influence their choices. Russia, in particular, has developed what amounts to a playbook over the years, adapting it to the specific characteristics of individual countries.
For Teresa Coratella, deputy head of the Rome office at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Europe has made progress in building the tools needed to confront these threats. But significant gaps remain — from the lack of effective coordination in attributing attacks to the different speeds at which European capitals recognize and respond to the threat.
- And as the war in Ukraine continues, the key challenge will be preventing Europe’s internal divisions from becoming Russia’s most effective leverage.
Q: Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani says a hybrid war is already “underway” and has warned of a significant risk of interference in upcoming European elections. How real is the threat today, and what are the main tools hostile actors use to influence our democracies?
A: The hybrid threat is no longer a threat. Hybrid attacks are now part of our reality and of the everyday environment in which we Europeans live, particularly since we began supporting Ukraine against the Russian invasion.
- There are many tools: cyberattacks, drones, sabotage and attacks on critical infrastructure, as well as the weaponization of migration.
- The weaponization of migration was one of the first tools used by Russia through Belarus against Poland. But the most visible and tangible tool remains disinformation. Fortunately, this is also an area where Europe has built a toolbox to map, manage and respond to influence operations.
Q: From disinformation and cyberattacks to sabotage, economic pressure and the manipulation of public debate, how much has the very concept of conflict changed in the era of hybrid warfare?
A: The concept of conflict in the contemporary world has been completely transformed. It is an invisible conflict, something we cannot touch, and it has now penetrated every aspect of our society. In Ukraine, we are still dealing with a mixed situation, combining traditional and hybrid warfare. We in Europe, by contrast, are now fully involved in this form of confrontation.
- We have developed tools and strategies and changed our approach to the issue, but major shortcomings remain. The first concerns attribution: there is still no fully effective European coordination system among capitals for attributing hybrid attacks. That is a very serious issue that needs to be addressed.
- The second problem is the different speeds at which member states understand and manage the threat. Countries in Northern and Eastern Europe are much more advanced, partly for historical and geographical reasons. Others, such as Italy, are still in a more difficult position.
Q: The case of Roberto Vannacci – a former general, now the emerging leader of a far-right positions with his new party Futuro Nazionale – has shown how the relationship between Italian politics, social media, identity-based narratives, and Russia can become part of the debate over foreign influence. How do we distinguish the legitimate circulation of ideas and political support from an actual influence operation?
A: Vannacci has introduced a new way of communicating and doing politics in Italy, starting with provocations and using very traditional themes — such as the negative consequences of supporting Ukraine or the need to return to Russian gas — before moving to innovative forms of communication, particularly through social media and artificial intelligence.
- This has introduced a new element into Italy’s communications landscape, with one very important consequence: the boundaries between politics, social media and identity-based narratives have gradually been eroded.
Q: Russia is the main actor identified by European governments. Is Moscow actually changing the way it operates, or are we dealing with a structural strategy that is likely to continue even after the war in Ukraine?
A: Over the years, Russia has built a real playbook for pursuing its objectives through hybrid warfare. But it has had to modify, shape and adapt that playbook depending on the countries and actors within its sphere of action.
- Italy is a good example. It is a very complex country to decipher from a social, cultural, historical, political and economic perspective. Yet Russia has managed to identify the most effective levers to use in our country.
- I am thinking of the strong commercial ties built between Italy and Russia in the decades before the invasion of Ukraine, but also of cultural and social links with the Communist tradition: Italy had the largest Communist Party in the West.
- Then there is Italy’s traditional fear of conflict. We are a country with a strong pacifist culture, critical attitudes toward the United States and a very strong relationship with the Vatican. Russia has used all these elements to enter the Italian debate and try to influence it.
- And we should not forget the economic situation: economic difficulties are a perfect lever for fueling Italians’ fears. That is precisely one of Russia’s objectives, as it is for other actors.
Q: Hybrid warfare increasingly seems to take place in the “gray zone,” below the threshold that would trigger a military response. How can we determine when a hostile action crosses that threshold and requires a collective response from NATO or the EU?
A: Europe and NATO are making a major effort to maintain a balance among the different positions of member states and allies. On one side are the countries that have historically been more exposed and sensitive to the Russian threat. On the other are states, particularly in Southern Europe, that have needed more time to understand the scale of the threat.
- It is a very difficult balancing act, and it is already causing friction. We saw this in the debate over whether to invoke NATO’s Article 4, which exposed divisions among allies.
- And this is precisely where we need to be careful, because Russia will exploit our divisions above all: divisions over escalation in the conflict and over how to manage hybrid attacks against different member states.
- For now, solidarity is prevailing. It has been expressed from North to South and across different political camps. But the balance remains very fragile.
Q: Looking beyond the immediate crisis in Ukraine, what should we expect in the coming years? Is hybrid warfare becoming the standard form of competition between powers, and what role should Europe play in this new environment?
A: Hybrid warfare can already be described as a standard form of conflict. There are of course exceptions, as the case of Ukraine unfortunately demonstrates, but hybrid warfare is now part of our everyday reality.
- What role should Europe play? First, it needs to establish coordinated action, particularly at the political level. Response mechanisms exist, as do tools shared with NATO and forms of military cooperation. We have already demonstrated all of this.
- What is still missing is comprehensive political coordination. Strong divisions remain within the EU. Hungary has long been an obstacle to establishing a unified position on how to respond to Russia.
- By now, we should have reached a point of greater dialogue and cohesion, but Europe’s response remains too slow and continues to face significant difficulties.
Q: Could the next European electoral cycle become another battleground over Russia and security? How much could it affect the EU’s ability to maintain a common position?
A: The main obstacle is precisely what lies ahead on the electoral front. The next cycle will be particularly important and will involve some of the EU’s largest member states, including Italy, France and Poland.
- It is inevitable that election campaigns will end up influencing the debate over security and Russia. We can already see it in Italy. We have seen it in Salvini’s statements on the Russian threat, and we can also see it in the way Vannacci uses political communication.
- The electoral campaign therefore risks becoming the biggest obstacle to coordinated European action in response to the Russian threat.
