As the EU pushes ahead with the green and digital transition, a new vulnerability has become impossible to ignore: Europe remains structurally dependent on Beijing for the materials that power wind turbines, batteries, semiconductors, and advanced defence systems. The final report of the Foreign Affairs Committee’s inquiry, promoted by Italian MP Onori, offers a sobering picture — and a roadmap.
The big picture: The document was approved unanimously — a rare moment in which Italian politics converged on a non-ideological, pragmatic view of economic security. And while China “is not the enemy,” Onori warns, it is “the main source of risk and uncertainty” because of the monopoly it has built over extraction and processing. Europe, she argues, spent years “chasing economic convenience” while Beijing invested in economic security.
Why she matters: Federica Onori has led one of the most substantial parliamentary efforts in recent years to link industrial policy, critical raw materials, and foreign policy. The inquiry she promoted in the Foreign Affairs Committee since early 2023 maps Italy’s vulnerabilities, highlights strategic partners (from Australia to Mercosur countries and Ukraine), and ties the debate to broader European initiatives, including the Mattei Plan.
Q: Your inquiry highlights that rare earths are no longer just an industrial issue but a geopolitical one. What are the main findings?
A: The investigation produced several technical conclusions, but two political elements stand out.
- First, the topic has immediate implications for international relations, which is why we addressed it in the Foreign Affairs Committee, while also engaging with industrial and supply-chain aspects. The way Europe sources key raw materials affects its geopolitical posture.
- Second, the document was approved unanimously. This shows that a non-ideological, pragmatic approach is possible and necessary. The transition cannot rely only on European resources; a composite, multi-layered plan of action is essential.
Q: What concrete options emerged to improve Italy’s and Europe’s position?
A: There is no single solution, but several avenues must be pursued at once.
- One is to map Italy’s own mineral resources — a domain we fully control, though reopening extractive activities would involve environmental “costs” that we tend to externalise.
- As Guillaume Pitron argues in La guerre des métaux rares, bringing mining closer to home forces societies to confront the real cost of their consumption model.
- Alongside this, diversification is crucial.
Q: Diversification toward whom?
A: Toward like-minded partners capable of providing a sustainable, reliable supply.
- Mercosur countries — notably Brazil, which has significant reserves of graphite, neodymium, and praseodymium — stand out.
- Other key partners include Australia, Japan, and even Ukraine.
- They all offer alternatives to China, which currently holds an almost total monopoly on both extraction and processing — and has already demonstrated its ability to restrict access.
Q: If China remains dominant, what room for manoeuvre do Italy and Europe really have? Can they act alone?
A: China is not the enemy, but it is the primary source of risk because of its monopoly, and we should have noticed earlier. Europe prioritised short-term economic convenience, while China focused on long-term financial security.
- We need a paradigm shift: adopting an economic-security mindset, avoiding ideological frames, and collaborating with the right partners to achieve objectives that are simultaneously national and European.
- This includes cooperation through Mercosur, as well as through the Mattei Plan.
Q: What role can the Mattei Plan play?
A: It is a significant opportunity for Italy to build bilateral relations with African countries that could ensure more strategic and durable access to critical materials.
- Italy should then “Europeanise” these partnerships.
- Examples already exist, such as the French and Danish projects in Greenland, as well as the German-Canadian initiative — all of which must be understood within a continental framework.
- A European strategy is indispensable, even with the inevitable delays and complexities that may arise.
Q: The report also highlights recycling and substitution technologies. How should Italy position itself?
A: Italy is behind the European average. These materials are difficult to obtain, and sourcing them creates geopolitical exposure.
- Recycling and reuse are essential steps, and Italy must invest more.
- There is also the possibility of innovative substitutes, such as materials synthesised from non-critical inputs. However, until the technology is available at scale, policymakers cannot rely on it.
- Their role is to support research and development — not to base strategy on hypothetical breakthroughs.
The bottom line: Europe’s drive for green and digital leadership collides with a structural dependency on China. As Onori argues, managing this vulnerability requires a shift from economic convenience to economic security — combining domestic mapping, diversified partnerships from Mercosur to Australia, and a strategic use of the Mattei Plan within a broader European framework.
- For Italy and Europe alike, the challenge of rare earths is not only industrial — it is geopolitical, and the window for correcting past complacency is narrowing.
