As the international order continues to fragment, the European Union faces a fundamental question about its role and capabilities. Between the erosion of the liberal order, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and a more transactional relationship with the United States, Europe is under pressure to reconcile its economic weight with its limited capacity to act as a strategic power.
In this conversation, Giampiero Massolo reflects on the EU’s enduring weaknesses in security and foreign policy, the debate on integration versus sovereignty, and the conditions under which Europe can remain a relevant actor rather than a passive object of global power dynamics.
Why he matters: Giampiero Massolo is a career diplomat and currently President of ISPI. He is also President of Mundys and teaches courses on national interest and security at LUISS. A former Secretary General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and senior security official, he is widely regarded as one of Italy’s most authoritative voices on international affairs.
Q: Recent remarks by Mario Draghi have raised a stark question: should Europe remain a large market, or become a power? Do you share this assessment?
A: Europe is now experiencing the consequences of the collapse of a liberal international order and the uncertainty of a transitional phase in which the law of the strongest increasingly prevails.
- In this context, the European Union finds itself ill at ease: for historical, cultural, and political reasons, it is not naturally inclined to think of itself as a power.
- It will never be a bellicose entity, but in a world governed by force and influence, it must nonetheless equip itself so as not to remain merely the object of others’ decisions.
Q: According to Draghi, the way forward lies in strengthening integration. Where do you see the core issue?
A: Draghi’s prescription is simple and logical, but the real issue lies in the very nature of the Union. A confederation of states, however well coordinated, remains weak.
- A federation, by contrast, becomes an entity and therefore acquires power. The problem is that it is difficult to find federal solutions for every issue at once.
- Hence, the idea of a pragmatic federalism: transfers of sovereignty where possible, and among those states ready to make them, a kind of variable-geometry federation.
Q: In which areas has Europe already shown that this approach can work?
A: As Draghi has noted, where integration has been achieved—trade, currency, the single market—Europe matters. Where it has not—foreign policy, defence, and security—it does not.
- The paradox is that this weakness ultimately undermines even those areas in which the Union is strong. Without unity in the most political domains, economic strength alone risks being insufficient.
- Yet despite the immense pressure Europe is facing today—the war in Ukraine, the need to establish credible deterrence vis-à-vis Russia, and an American administration that no longer takes Europe’s security guarantees for granted—there is still no sign of the political will required to move decisively toward real transfers of sovereignty.
Q: On the economic and trade front, however, the EU appears more dynamic at the start of 2026. Do the Mercosur and India agreements signal a shift?
A: They reflect an acknowledgement of reality. We are living in a phase of deglobalisation, with shrinking markets and tariffs increasingly used as instruments of power. Dependence on the United States is becoming burdensome, while dependence on China would be inappropriate.
- Europe is therefore compelled to seek new markets. Mercosur and India point precisely in that direction. Yet internal difficulties continue to emerge even on these dossiers.
- This is the limit of the European method. After twenty-five years, an agreement such as Mercosur can be concluded, only for its ratification to be postponed by the European Parliament.
- If this happens in a concrete field like trade, one can easily imagine how much more complex it is to proceed on identity-defining issues such as sovereignty in defence and security.
Q: In recent days, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has visited China, shortly after a visit by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. How should Europe interpret these moves?
A: The choice of partners falls within the scope of strategic autonomy. But today, security considerations increasingly overlap with economic convenience.
- Dialogue is legitimate, and seeking opportunities is understandable, but there must be a clear awareness of limits. Pushing these relationships to their extreme consequences would require a degree of independence that Europe currently lacks.
Q: Turning to Ukraine, what can we realistically expect from the talks between Kyiv, Moscow, and Washington taking place on 5 February?
A: The central issue remains that of territory. Russia’s demand that Ukraine withdraw from parts of the Donbas that it has not militarily conquered is unacceptable for Kyiv for two reasons.
- Constitutionally, because Ukraine’s constitution does not allow for the cession of territory, and in terms of security, because those areas constitute a defensive stronghold, and losing them would open the way to future Russian advances.
- This is without even considering the profound humanitarian tragedy and the loss of life incurred in defending those territories, which makes any such concession politically and morally impossible.
Q: What strategy is the American mediator pursuing?
A: The US administration is attempting to bring positions closer on three fronts.
-
- The first concerns the status of contested territories that Russia has not conquered, with the idea of creating a demilitarised zone.
- The second relates to security guarantees for Ukraine in exchange for territorial concessions.
- The third involves economic assistance for reconstruction.
- What is missing, however, are two decisive elements: real American pressure on Russia, and a genuine Russian willingness to make peace.
Q: More than a year after Donald Trump’s return to the White House, how would you define transatlantic relations?
A: The relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic has become transactional, with the United States placing its power on the table and challenging Europe on ideological, economic, and security grounds. Europe should accept the challenge, but deconstruct it along three dimensions.
- First, it should avoid overemphasising ideological confrontation, which the administration often uses instrumentally. On security, we must realistically acknowledge that, for the foreseeable future, we will still need the United States.
- To keep the Americans engaged in Europe, we must demonstrate that we are assuming our responsibilities and are fully capable of providing for our own defence, including in budgetary terms.
- This is where the outcome of the war in Ukraine will be decided: defending Ukraine means defending Europe’s security.
- Finally, on the economic front, a mixed approach is required—credible measures of response and retaliation, combined with a willingness to engage in dialogue when confrontation becomes negotiable.
The bottom line: According to Giampiero Massolo, Europe’s challenge is not to become a military power by vocation, but to avoid strategic irrelevance in a world shaped by force.
- Without deeper, albeit selective, integration in security and foreign policy, the Union risks seeing even its economic strength diluted.
- Strategic autonomy, in this sense, is less a slogan than a long-term necessity—one that will determine whether Europe can act as a subject of power, rather than merely adapt to the decisions of others.
