Why it matters: European officials are weighing a plan to cut red tape that slows the movement of allied forces across the continent — a proposal increasingly described as a “military Schengen” for defence mobility.
What happened: At the Military Mobility and Resilience Forum in Vilnius, EU leaders and defense officials highlighted bureaucratic and infrastructure barriers that can delay troop deployments by days or even weeks. The issue has gained urgency as European intelligence assessments warn that Russia could be in a position to test NATO’s defences later this decade.
The problem: EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius cited cases in which allied tanks were blocked at borders because their weight exceeded civilian road limits, forcing costly and time‑consuming sea transport instead.
- Some member states still require up to 45 days’ notice for troop movements.
- Rules differ not only between countries but sometimes between regions.
- Europe’s peacetime infrastructure is not designed for rapid, large‑scale military transport.
Kubilius argued that credible deterrence depends on mobility. “There is no credible deterrence without military mobility,” he said, warning that without the ability to move forces quickly, collective defence risks remaining theoretical rather than operational.
- He described a system in which convoys can change legal status when crossing borders, and in which commanders face layers of bureaucratic hurdles before moving tens of thousands of troops and vehicles.
Driving the push: The European Commission’s Military Mobility Package — presented last November — aims to replace a patchwork of 27 national systems with a single EU framework.
- Proposals include simplified customs procedures, a single notification process, a common emergency protocol, and an EU‑wide permit issued within three days through a new digital platform coordinating cross‑border transport approvals.
- Officials say the goal is to enable reinforcements to move across Europe as easily as people and goods do within the Schengen area.
Details: Kubilius said the proposed system would dramatically streamline procedures in both crisis and peacetime. In an emergency, troop movements would no longer require prior permits — countries would be notified of transit.
- In peacetime, a single EU‑wide authorisation valid across all member states would replace national approvals, issued within a maximum of 3 days.
- A new digital platform would coordinate cross‑border transport permits and customs formalities, aiming to remove administrative bottlenecks that currently slow deployments.
The Italian view: European Commission Executive Vice‑President Raffaele Fitto and former Italian Defence Minister Mario Mauro emphasised the need to align military mobility with a broader political strategy that links NATO, European defence initiatives and transatlantic relations.
- Mauro argued that the war in Ukraine demonstrated three lessons: logistics determines battlefield outcomes, rail remains the backbone of heavy military transport, and industrial depth underpins resilience.
- He framed infrastructure spending as both a security necessity and an economic opportunity, particularly along the EU’s eastern flank.
- “When we invest in dual‑use infrastructure — rail corridors, terminals, bridges, ports — we are not choosing between defence and the economy. We strengthen both,” Mauro said.
- Fitto and Mauro’s interventions underscored a broader political objective: ensuring that Europe’s defence ambitions remain anchored to NATO and the transatlantic alliance, rather than developing in isolation.
Italy’s additional push: Rome also frames Corridor VIII as a core element of Europe’s emerging military mobility architecture. Speaking at the Tirana ministerial, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said the Adriatic‑to‑Black Sea link would facilitate faster movement of forces and equipment across the Balkans, aligning infrastructure development with NATO requirements.
- Italian officials see the corridor as complementing the EU’s proposed “military Schengen” by strengthening the Alliance’s southeastern flank and integrating Western Balkan transport networks into a wider system of dual‑use routes capable of supporting both trade and rapid troop deployment.
The bottom line: The debate over a “military Schengen” reflects a shift in EU defence thinking — from focusing primarily on capabilities and spending to addressing the bureaucratic and logistical constraints that determine whether those capabilities can actually be used in a crisis.
