Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s upcoming visit to Baku is not merely a diplomatic stop, but part of a broader and structured effort to safeguard Italy’s national interest. At a time of heightened geopolitical volatility and energy uncertainty, Rome appears to be pursuing a pragmatic and multidimensional strategy—one that connects immediate supply needs with longer-term positioning, including through initiatives such as the Mattei Plan.
According to Gabriele Checchia, a seasoned diplomat and former Italian Ambassador to Lebanon, NATO, and key international organizations (OECD, ESA, IEA), the government’s approach reflects both strategic clarity and operational responsiveness. From the Gulf to North Africa and the Caucasus, Italy is attempting to consolidate a diversified energy posture while remaining firmly anchored within the European framework.
Q. After the Gulf and Tunisia, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni will soon travel to Azerbaijan to strengthen Italy’s energy supply. In five years, the TAP pipeline has ensured a capacity of 10 billion cubic meters annually (increased to 11.2 billion since January). How do these figures translate politically for Italy’s energy needs?
A: I would say they translate in a decidedly positive way. They reflect the sense of urgency that the government and Giorgia Meloni have sought to give to the energy supply dossier, at a time that is, in many respects, dramatic—not only from a geopolitical standpoint, but also in terms of household living standards, with significant increases in energy bills looming on the horizon.
- Therefore, rightly so, the government—sensitive to the challenges faced by families and businesses—has sought to put in place a broad-based strategy, a sort of Gulf–Algeria–Azerbaijan “trident,” aimed at mitigating these difficulties as much as possible. I view these energy missions positively, and they are not even all directly linked to the Iranian crisis or developments in the Gulf.
Q. Why is that?
A: Because they reflect a long-term strategy that predates current events, although recent developments have certainly accelerated it. The government has decided to act effectively, with the goal of ensuring short-term energy autonomy and mitigating the immediate risk of unsustainable price increases for middle- and lower-income households.
- It is a clear-sighted view of the problem, taking into account multiple variables. I would also link this to the Mattei Plan—namely, the attention the Prime Minister is giving to gas suppliers from the African continent, along with all the initiatives being launched under that framework. Overall, it seems to me that we are looking at an integrated and common-sense strategy.
Q. The three trips, prompted by the crisis in Hormuz—what do they mean in terms of political strategy and decision-making speed?
A: They reflect a particular attention by the government to the energy dimension, and also a capacity for rapid response. If I’m not mistaken, Giorgia Meloni was the first head of government from a G20 country, as well as from the European Union and NATO, to travel to the Gulf after the outbreak of the crisis.
- This, in my view, captures the overall approach, fully aware of how dependent Italy is on external energy sources. The objective is clearly to defend national interests as effectively as possible.
- As the Hormuz situation is demonstrating, energy has now become one of the key geopolitical variables and levers for ensuring that a country can pursue an autonomous foreign policy, free from external pressure—often from actors that are not friendly.
Q. TAP has proven to be a key infrastructure for Europe and a strategic hub for supply diversification. How would a possible expansion of TAP intersect with discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean and the potential need for another pipeline between Israel, Cyprus, and Italy?
A: Seeing TAP operating at full capacity strengthens Italy’s national energy independence. If there were also progress on the EastMed project—which is currently in a holding phase due to well-known geopolitical challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean, largely linked to Greek-Turkish tensions—so much the better.
- However, in my view, TAP should not be considered an essential component of EastMed. They are two distinct but, in many respects, complementary projects. The government is moving, where possible, to advance quickly, and among these efforts, the doubling of TAP would aim at around 20 billion cubic meters annually—equivalent to roughly a quarter of Italy’s national demand.
- Overcoming, as I hope will be possible in the medium term, the political obstacles hindering EastMed would provide an additional lever to present Italy as an energy-independent country, capable of making its voice heard without fear of pressure or coercion from third parties—likely not our friends.
Q. What is Italy’s weight within the European initiative on Iran?
A: It is considerable, and it operates in coordination with major European countries, particularly France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Our Prime Minister has taken part in the conference of 40 countries willing to deploy mine countermeasure vessels in the Strait once hostilities—hopefully soon—come to an end.
- We are therefore aligned with the major European capitals and with Europe as a whole. This is a rebuttal to those who claim that Italy is isolated within Europe. It is a wise and forward-looking choice, without breaking ties—as some in Italy would instead advocate—with the United States, which remains an indispensable ally.
- Italy’s strong expertise in mine clearance will undoubtedly prove valuable.
Q. The stakes in Hormuz go far beyond Italy alone…
A: We have seen this clearly in relation to global fertilizer trade. It is therefore essential for us to be involved. Rome is pursuing a balanced policy, based on respect and on technological excellence that no one disputes.
- As the Prime Minister recently pointed out, instability is no longer the exception but the norm. As a result, practical and pragmatic solutions must be found.
