Hybrid threats

Disrupting Hybrid Coercion. From Reactive Defence to Strategic Initiative

The recent succession of acts of sabotage, cyberattacks, and suspicious alerts across Europe calls for a reconsideration of the nature and evolution of hybrid coercion. This analysis offers a comparative examination of Russian, Chinese, and Iranian strategic models, distinguishing their operational cultures, objectives, instruments, and conceptions of time. At its core are the vulnerabilities of Western decision-making architectures, the fragmentation of responses, and the asymmetries that enable hostile actors to seize the initiative. The analysis concludes with operational proposals: from the establishment of a National Security Council and information monitoring of electoral processes to the preemptive use of intelligence to identify and disrupt the organizational, financial, and operational dependencies of hostile apparatuses. Among the proposals is also the possibility of exploiting geopolitical divergences and strategic incompatibilities among hostile actors, moving beyond an interpretation based exclusively on their shared anti-Western interests. The objective? An active posture directed both at the manifestations of the threat and at the mechanisms that enable its recurrence and determine its effectiveness.

The Great Game. Major powers and other actors within the international system compete to expand their respective spheres of influence and, under certain configurations of the balance of power, to attain a hegemonic position. Such competition does not necessarily entail the use of kinetic force.

  • The overturning of existing power balances, including through gradual processes, can be pursued through political, economic, informational, and social instruments capable of altering adversaries’ behaviour, constraining their decision-making autonomy, and influencing the conditions under which they exercise their sovereignty.
  • From the perspective of revisionist powers, one objective of this competition is to introduce discontinuity into the existing international order, facilitating the diminution of the Western-led, and particularly US-led, status quo and the establishment of arrangements more closely aligned with their own interests.
  • The significance of this aspiration derives from the function of international orders: their institutions, norms, and procedures regulate interactions among actors, introduce elements of stability and predictability, and confer relatively enduring advantages upon those operating within the system.
  • Competing for influence therefore also means competing for the capacity to determine the rules of the game, promoting the adoption of standards consistent with one’s strategic interests. A hegemonic position confers a privileged role in shaping those rules while simultaneously expanding the room for manoeuvre necessary to interpret, instrumentalise, or circumvent them according to one’s priorities.
  • Within this framework, the informational dimension acquires autonomous political significance: it contributes to persuading communities and public opinion, at the local, regional, and international levels, of the legitimacy of a particular cause and of the right of the actor advancing it to assert that cause.

The Repertoire of Hybrid Coercion. Competition for influence can draw upon a heterogeneous repertoire of instruments of power, whose effectiveness often derives from their combined deployment, incremental application, and the difficulty of tracing apparently distinct events to a common strategic objective. The principal operational modalities include:

  • The instrumentalisation of linguistic, religious, political, and ethnic minorities residing within the territories of other states;
  • The instrumental use of religion and ideology to support the domestic narratives and political objectives of the initiating actor;
  • The employment of operations designed to impede attribution through subversion, destabilisation, and information manipulation;
  • The activation of economic, energy, industrial, and financial instruments of coercion;
  • The deliberate, including artificially induced, proliferation of crisis flashpoints across the international system;
  • The employment of agents and influence networks embedded within the ruling elites of target states;
  • The involvement, across theatres of competition, of non-state actors, industrial, energy, and technological entities, diplomatic channels, and proxy actors;
  • The instrumentalisation of public opinion and electoral dynamics to deepen internal divisions within democracies, alongside the saturation of the information ecosystem and the distortion of perceptions of the surrounding environment;
  • The use of asymmetric, incremental, and fragmented tactics, including electoral interference, economic coercion, information manipulation, sabotage of critical infrastructure, cyberattacks, acts of vandalism, the involvement of local criminal networks, and the instrumentalization of migration flows;
  • The construction of an environment of permanent competition in which the psychological dimension affects the social cohesion and democratic resilience of the target state;
  • Efforts to counter the expansion of influence and the external projection of the interests of the targeted state or states, including through interdiction and sabotage operations within the relevant geographical and geopolitical theaters.

The hybrid nature of this repertoire therefore derives not merely from the presence of different instruments, but from their potential combined employment to generate consequences across the diplomatic, legal, intelligence, military, economic, informational, and institutional domains of liberal democracies. From this perspective, the report by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats identifies saturation effects, cascading effects, and high-impact operations as three discernible operational trends, characterised respectively by the variables of volume, time, and intensity. The hybrid threat thus constitutes a continuous stress test of institutions’ capacities for anticipation, resilience, and decision-making.

Chess and Go: Two Strategic Logics Compared. Russia and China are frequently, and erroneously, subsumed within a single repertoire of below-threshold competition, characterised by cyber operations, information manipulation, economic coercion, the employment of proxies and non-state actors, regulatory pressure, and the calibrated use of military and non-military instruments below the threshold conventionally associated with overt warfare.

  • Although this classification captures genuinely shared features, it risks obscuring substantially different strategic approaches. Moscow and Beijing may indeed employ analogous instruments; what differs above all is the grammar governing their employment, namely the relationship between operational methodologies, aggressiveness, time horizons, risk propensity, the accumulation of advantage, and the function of coercion.

The comparison between chess and weiqi, or Go, provides a useful interpretative framework for distinguishing two ideal-typical strategic logics.

  • In chess, the disposition of forces is understood primarily in terms of direct confrontation, pressure exerted upon decisive points, and the possibility of constraining an adversary within a circumscribed sequence of responses.
  • In Go, by contrast, advantage tends to derive from the relative configuration of positions, the progressive occupation of space, and the transformation of marginal gains into structural superiority.

Applied to contemporary competition, this distinction suggests that Russia tends to employ the grey zone predominantly as an environment of coercive disruption, whereas China more frequently utilises it as a domain for the incremental transformation of the status quo through the gradual shaping of theatres of confrontation.

  • This is an analytical distinction between prevailing strategic orientations, rather than a rigid separation or an assertion of exclusivity in the instruments employed.

The Russian Approach: Coercive Disruption and Threshold Testing. Russia’s operational approach appears more heavily oriented toward generating political and operational vulnerabilities within the adversary state.

  • Sabotage, cyber activities, the employment of proxies and non-state actors, covert or false-flag operations, and information campaigns need not individually produce decisive effects. Rather, their strategic value lies in their capacity to impose costs, erode the target’s internal cohesion and democratic resilience, and simultaneously test its willingness to respond. Their effectiveness also depends on the ability to exploit pre-existing divisions among states, political parties, and citizens, without necessarily having to generate them ex novo.

What emerges is a domain of strategic interaction in which the aggressor can continuously test the levels of pressure that the defender is prepared to absorb.

  • The boiling frog metaphor intuitively captures the process of progressive adaptation to increasingly burdensome coercive conditions: each incident may appear manageable in isolation, while their succession alters the threshold of what is perceived as tolerable or ordinary, and therefore as falling below Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – a factor that can no longer be taken for granted, given the numerous questions surrounding military, intelligence, and diplomatic cooperation between the United States and Europe and, not least, Washington’s role within NATO.
  • It is precisely within the domain of perception and assessment of ongoing aggression that the asymmetric threats of recent weeks have unfolded: never individually sufficiently severe to constitute an armed attack, and never collectively attributable to a single actor with a degree of certainty capable of triggering a coordinated response at either the European or national level.
  • This is because the threshold, being fundamentally a matter of assessment rather than a technical or military determination, is eminently political. Its progressive elevation also reflects the difficulty democracies face in mobilising public support and political capital against a threat dispersed across incidents of limited intensity.
  • It follows that the function of an operation does not necessarily coincide with the immediate material damage it causes, but rather with the cumulative effects of multiple operations which, once concluded, provide their perpetrator with an informational return derived from the modalities, timing, and intensity of the adversary’s response.

The Systemic Nature of the Threat and Decision-Making Asymmetries. The systemic nature of hybrid coercion becomes particularly evident when comparing autocratic regimes and democracies. For the latter, the principal challenge does not necessarily lie in the technological or strategic superiority of their adversaries, but in the fragmentation of their own decision-making architecture.

  • The threat, in fact, affects the relationship between political authority, society, and the decision-making process. In democratic systems, the need to maintain public support, remain accountable to public opinion, and periodically subject governmental action to electoral scrutiny constitutes a foundational principle of legitimacy. It is precisely this responsiveness that can become the object of external coercion.
  • The objective extends beyond altering political preferences, also manifesting itself in the modification of the domestic costs associated with adopting particular decisions. Polarisation can be amplified; perceptions of risk and of the surrounding environment manipulated; trust in institutions weakened; and distributive conflicts and socioeconomic anxieties exacerbated.
  • These dynamics may be accompanied by the deliberate generation of humanitarian, migratory, biological, or diplomatic crises capable of absorbing resources and constraining policymakers’ room for manoeuvre.
  • The combination of an open digital ecosystem and a plurality of decision-making centres expands the attack surface, offering hostile actors opportunities for interference that are scarcely comparable to those available within more centralised systems.

Within this framework, a temporal and political-institutional asymmetry emerges across at least three levels.

a) At the transatlantic level, asynchronous electoral cycles, diverging priorities between US strategic projection (e.g., the Indo-Pacific) and European security imperatives on the eastern flank and in the Mediterranean, together with disagreements over defence burden-sharing, slow the formulation of coordinated responses;

b) At the European level, the Union’s considerable regulatory and economic capacity does not always translate into timely geopolitical action: the frequent requirement for unanimity in the most sensitive foreign-policy decisions and the absence of a fully integrated defence architecture multiply the stages of coordination;

c) At the national level, polarisation and fragile governing majorities may subordinate strategically necessary choices to their immediate electoral costs. An autocratic regime, under certain circumstances, can instead maintain greater continuity of strategic direction and speed in assuming risks. A hybrid operation may therefore unfold within hours, while the response must navigate negotiations, vetoes, and political deadlines, exposing a vulnerability throughout the entire process through which democratic political will is formed.

These considerations do not, however, imply any intrinsic or permanent weakness of democracy. Transparency, pluralism, alternation in government, public oversight, and the capacity for institutional self-correction constitute potentially decisive resources for a resilient system. Complexity arises when a hostile actor converts such responsiveness into a political constraint, widening the gap between what is strategically necessary and what is electorally acceptable in the immediate term. In the face of exceptionally intense pressure and hostility, checks and balances must nevertheless be complemented by procedures enabling timely decision-making convergence, so that the safeguarding of democratic oversight does not translate into paralysis or passivity.

  • The strategic relevance of a non-passive posture toward the extensive repertoire of asymmetric hostile operations lies in the possibility that a single operation may generate cascading effects throughout the entire political-institutional system, particularly in the absence of whole-of-society approaches based on the functional integration of institutions, intelligence services, economic operators, critical infrastructure, and civil society.
  • Plausible deniability also constitutes a central component of the coercive architecture. A hostile operation – or a set of activities – may be attributed analytically with a relatively high degree of confidence while nevertheless retaining scope for political denial through the employment of proxies, intermediaries, or mechanisms capable of formally separating the sponsor from the perpetrator. The distinction between identifying the responsible actor, strategically assessing the campaign, and making a political attribution is consequential rather than merely terminological, since it conditions liberal democracies’ ability to translate an attribution assessment into a public and collective response.
  • If one or more hostile operations provide information concerning the capabilities, objectives, and methods of the actor conducting them, then, symmetrically, every response or instance of inaction by the target state generates an informational return for the aggressor. How many incidents are required to trigger a national response? Which events induce coordination among allies? What degree of attribution is required before costs are imposed? Which operations are absorbed as isolated incidents? How does public opinion respond, and in what direction does public support shift? These questions encapsulate an essential component of the operational rationale underlying below-threshold coercion.
  • The cumulative dimension – difficult to identify because of the threat’s multi-vector character, gradualism, dispersion, and asymmetry – thus seeks to generate a divergence between the respective units of analysis. The aggressor plans and evaluates in aggregate terms, whereas the defender tends to examine incidents and respond to them in a segmented manner. A succession of heterogeneous incidents may be interpreted as a series of local dysfunctions, even though its strategic significance emerges only through the reconstruction of interdependencies, temporal sequencing, and potential common objectives. The hostile actor’s advantage therefore acquires a multiplicative character when internal divisions are compounded by delays in coordination among intelligence services, political authorities, judicial institutions, and allies.
  • From this perspective, saturation – that is, the progressive overloading of the target state’s detection, analysis, adaptation, and response capabilities – is generated by the volume of operations, which may also be conducted by distinct and not necessarily coordinated actors, thereby overwhelming defensive mechanisms, consuming resources, and eroding absorptive and adaptive capacity. Cascading effects, by contrast, describe the possibility that the consequences of an incident may subsequently be exploited, either by the same actor or by others, across different domains, even when the initial operation has failed to achieve its intended outcome.
  • This is why analytical activity should seek to distinguish between demonstrated coordination, opportunistic convergence, and systemic effects arising from interdependencies across domains.

The Chinese Approach: Incremental Transformation of the Strategic Environment. The Chinese approach exhibits a different configuration, despite sharing part of its operational repertoire with the Russian model. Beijing employs coercive and cyber instruments, information operations, and formally civilian apparatuses; their use, however, appears more frequently directed toward the progressive transformation of the strategic environment than toward the immediate destabilisation of an adversary. As in Go, the value of an individual move also lies in the positions and operational possibilities it will make available subsequently.

  • This strategic orientation can be described through the pursuit of continuity: presence, consolidation, normalisation, and the overlapping deployment of civilian and dual-use, economic-financial, legal, military, technological, ideological, and informational instruments. The progressive accumulation of positions and relationships can contribute to creating energy, technological, economic, and political dependencies, thereby altering the conditions under which the targeted actor will evaluate its future alternatives. The consolidation of these dependencies can exploit, without necessarily creating, divergences among Western governments and political constituencies, progressively constraining their freedom of action.
  • This difference is also reflected in the employment of information. In the Russian case, influence frequently appears instrumental to fragmenting public debate, disseminating distrust, and manipulating perceptions, thereby increasing political uncertainty and complicating the formation of consensus regarding attribution and response. State-controlled media, official accounts, influence agents, paid influencers, fictitious identities, compromised accounts, and bot networks may contribute to a multilayered propaganda ecosystem.
  • In the Chinese case, information more frequently also assumes a preparatory and formative function: it contributes to defining in advance the ideological, normative, and perceptual framework within which particular practices will be interpreted and progressively regarded as acceptable. Control over the interpretative conditions surrounding events may thus precede and facilitate the acquisition of material, technological, and political advantages. Here too, the distinction concerns prevailing orientations and does not exclude the employment of instruments of immediate pressure or destabilising operations.

Russia, China, and Iran in the Information Domain. A further differentiating factor among models of hybrid competition concerns the architecture of influence ecosystems, the mechanisms through which narratives are propagated, and the strategic function assigned to information manipulation. The account provided by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) allows the comparison between Moscow and Beijing to be extended to the Iranian case. The think tank’s assessments delineate three distinct organisational configurations, united by their attempts to influence collective perceptions and the conditions under which political decisions acquire legitimacy, yet differing in both structure and prevailing strategic orientation.

  • In the Russian case, disinformation emerges as the product of an extensive asymmetric arsenal, supported by substantial resources and characterised by centralised strategic direction combined with decentralised execution. The serial production of content, the multiplicity of dissemination vectors, and the interaction between state resources and intermediary actors make it possible to increase the volume of pressure, while rendering the reconstruction of responsibility more resource-intensive and complicating responses confined to individual incidents.

According to research conducted by the Helsinki-based think tank, the system comprises four functional components: state-level orchestrators, intermediaries, executors – including media outlets and social networks – and censorship apparatuses. Funding streams, patronage relationships, and intermediary networks contribute to connecting these levels. The result is a multilayered propagation capacity in which the distribution of operational functions does not preclude convergence in political objectives, including the delegitimisation of democratic institutions and the fragmentation of public debate.

  • The Chinese approach, by contrast, assigns particular importance to the capacity to shape the information environment over time and promote the dissemination of its own representations of the international context. This approach involves a plurality of actors and tends to render the boundaries between propaganda, public diplomacy, corporate communications, and the promotion of political messaging increasingly permeable. Consistent with the incremental logic examined above, this orientation likewise entails the consolidation of favourable interpretative frameworks and the progressive normalisation of particular readings of events.

The differentiation between Moscow and Beijing does not, however, imply a rigid separation between their respective repertoires. Indeed, the two communication strategies display areas of convergence and forms of emulation in their influence techniques. The growing saturation of the digital environment with strategically oriented content may also have further implications when such material enters the corpora used to train large language models (LLM): the issue concerns the potential persistence of distortions within the AI-mediated information environment, without this, in itself, establishing an increase in the effectiveness of individual operations.

  • The Iranian case introduces a third configuration, characterised by a fragmented yet interconnected ecosystem. The framework outlined by the European Centre of Excellence encompasses state institutions, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps apparatuses, public broadcasters, media outlets affiliated with proxy actors, cyber actors, and informal networks, including digital amplification structures. Narratives, also disseminated through memes, may circulate within the domestic environment, the broader Middle Eastern information space, regime-aligned militias, diaspora communities, and polarised segments of Western societies. This gives rise to a capacity for transnational projection that does not necessarily presuppose uniform operational control over all intermediaries.
  • Taken together, the three models therefore demonstrate that informational coercion can be exercised through complex hierarchies, mechanisms of social entrenchment, or fragmented intermediary networks. The distinction remains analytically useful precisely because instruments may converge without producing uniformity in command structures, strategic cultures, or long-term political-operational objectives.
  • A comparison of the two models reveals a further distinction. Moscow’s modus operandi tends to employ ambiguity to increase the political cost of responding, whereas Beijing’s more frequently relies on gradualism to reduce the cost and visibility of a coercively imposed revision of the regional and international status quo. Within this interpretation, Russia tends to maximise the political impact of discontinuity through limited shocks, localised crises, sudden vulnerabilities, and attribution ambiguity. China, by contrast, tends to maximise the strategic effects of continuity through the consolidation of presence, norms, dependencies, and cumulative advantages.
  • For Moscow, time may constitute a variable to be compressed, generating urgency, surprise, polarisation, and pressure on decision-making processes. For Beijing, it more frequently represents a resource to be accumulated through environmental shaping, the progressive acquisition of capabilities, and the construction of advantageous positions and influence. Every action modifies, even if only marginally, the conditions under which the subsequent action will be interpreted and assessed. Both logics, however, confront the same Western difficulty: synchronising the speed of response with the continuity of strategic decision-making beyond electoral contingencies.

Toward a Posture of Active Deterrence. The transition from analysing individual incidents to assessing an entire campaign has direct implications for the response of democracies. The capacity to absorb attacks, although indispensable, is insufficient when an adversary can repeatedly conduct operations at limited cost, exploit cascading effects, and learn from the defender’s reactions. The issue extends well beyond reducing existing vulnerabilities, underscoring the urgency of actions capable of altering the relationship between costs, benefits, and probabilities of success as perceived by the aggressor.

In this regard, the JRC and Hybrid CoE report proposes an integrated resilience–deterrence strategy organised around three mutually interconnected phases:

a) proactive anticipation, active defence, and reactive response. Anticipation combines forecasting, preparedness, and deterrence;

b) active defence encompasses the detection, identification, and strategic assessment of an operation, alongside the restoration of functionality and political attribution; c) reactive response seeks to impose costs consistent with the applicable legal framework and proportionality requirements, thereby discouraging the recurrence of hostile activities.

Within this architecture, deterrence by denial reduces the probability of an operation’s success, while deterrence by punishment increases the expected cost of aggression. These approaches may be complemented by the preemptive exposure of operations (deterrence by disclosure), strategic communication, and allied coordination.

The relationship between attribution and political will remains decisive: publicly identifying a hostile actor’s responsibility without imposing credible consequences risks exposing the discrepancy between an operation’s impact and the response adopted. Credible deterrence requires the capacity to impose costs on a hostile actor even in the absence of incontrovertible attribution, while respecting legal constraints and the proportionality of the response, with the objective of reducing the temporal asymmetry that advantages the aggressor.

At the operational level, several potentially convergent lines of action emerge:

a) Establish graduated response protocols calibrated to the intensity, frequency, and cumulative effects of hostile operations, through previously agreed decision-making criteria, accelerated activation procedures, and sufficient flexibility to prevent the adversary from fully anticipating the timing and modalities of countermeasures. Early warning, timely information-sharing, and continuity of essential functions assume particular importance;

b) Establish a National Security Council, together with a corresponding National Security Strategy, capable of integrating political decision-makers, intelligence services, and competent authorities under a unified strategic direction, supported by the technical and scientific expertise of industry, universities, and critical infrastructure operators.

Such a structure should possess accelerated decision-making procedures and clearly defined, pre-established competences, enabling the immediate activation of legally authorised countermeasures without making every intervention contingent upon additional political-institutional stages. The timeliness of action would thus be reconciled with subsequent parliamentary oversight, to be exercised within predetermined time limits and in accordance with constitutional safeguards, preserving the state’s capacity to respond without compromising the principles of accountability and democratic legitimacy.

c) Strengthen institutional strategic communication, including through diplomatic channels and official digital platforms, complementing evidence-based rebuttals of hostile narratives with timely communication approaches—including memetic communication—adapted to different information environments, in order to mitigate their cognitive impact, constrain their amplification potential, and preserve institutional credibility.

d) Consolidate, at the societal level, school- and university-based programs in information literacy and cognitive resilience, targeting students and teachers and integrating them with structured forms of cooperation with digital platforms. Such measures contribute to building long-term resilience by reducing the susceptibility of the information ecosystem to manipulation and the instrumentalisation of social divisions.

e) Establish an independent Information Monitoring Committee tasked with monitoring foreign interference in local and national electoral processes, as well as those of EU and NATO member states, through coordination among intelligence services, electoral authorities, and competent institutions. The Committee should undertake continuous public information activities concerning the threats posed by manipulation and hostile influence, proactively strengthening the electorate’s cognitive resilience while respecting pluralism, political neutrality, and democratic safeguards;

f) Identify and exploit structural divergences among revisionist actors, moving beyond an interpretation of their respective hybrid activities based predominantly on the convergence of anti-Western interests.

The sharing of contingent objectives aimed at diminishing Western influence does not, in fact, imply an alignment of geopolitical ambitions, economic interests, or respective visions of the international order. An analysis of latent rivalries, mutual dependencies, and strategic incompatibilities among Russia, China, Iran, and their associated actors could make it possible to identify opportunities for diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and informational initiatives capable of increasing the costs of mutual cooperation and limiting operational convergence. This would transform asymmetries within the revisionist camp into a source of strategic advantage, addressing not only the coercive capabilities of individual actors but also the political and structural conditions that enable their coordination, without presupposing the existence of a unified and strategically homogeneous bloc;

g) Develop external operations involving preemptive and defensive power projection, strengthening measures to counter hybrid coercion by targeting the structural dependencies of the apparatuses responsible for its conduct.

  • This is because subversive operations, despite being characterised by fragmented execution, deniability, and reliance on intermediaries, nevertheless presuppose the continuity of specific organisational, financial, informational, and coordination functions, whose identification may enable targeted interventions across the entire operational architecture. Central to these considerations are the traceability – where feasible – of funding streams and front organisations, the identification of recruitment networks and their respective coordinators, the monitoring of narrative convergence, and the strengthening of transnational cooperation among intelligence services, judicial authorities, and law enforcement agencies.
  • It follows that an effective response, far from being confined exclusively to the capacity to neutralise individual manifestations of the threat, could extend to preemptively disrupting the organisational conditions that enable the recurrence and orchestration of both established and emerging asymmetric threats – including sabotage, the weaponisation of humanitarian crises and migration flows, propaganda networks, and proxy presence – in strategically significant geopolitical theatres such as the African continent or NATO’s eastern flank.
  • Deterrence would thereby acquire an additional dimension, grounded in the progressive reduction of the adversary’s operational freedom, provided that such measures are undertaken in accordance with democratic safeguards and the constraints of the rule of law.

Subscribe to our newsletter