The following are excerpts from our sister website’s interview with Stefania Craxi, President of the Senate’s Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. Please find the full translated text below.
On Mr Macron’s words on China. “[He] is right when he says that Europe needs its own strategic autonomy, especially in the fields of foreign and defence policy. But this shared ambition can only be cultivated within our traditional alliances, without imagining any supposed ‘thirdness’ or yielding to our systemic competitors of today and tomorrow.”
- “Europe and the US, together, are the backbone of the West and – I will never cease to repeat it – represent an alliance of values before being a political, military or economic alliance. Let’s not kid ourselves: Europe needs the US and vice versa. We are inextricably linked, by the past and the future.”
- “To divide the West, to separate even with linguistic sophistry or to give the impression of a lack of commonality of vision and intent between the US and the EU would be dramatic for everyone, especially for Europe.”
- “[L]ook: if we do not want to lose ourselves in empty and stale rhetoric, we must back up declarations with facts and proposals. If Mr Macron believes that European strategic and defence autonomy is necessary, as a first step towards achieving this goal he could make Paris’ permanent seat at the UN available to the EU.”
On France’s foreign policy stance. “Many theorise a new-found desire for ‘grandeur’ on the part of France, but even this has its limits and must come to terms with reality. Could it ever suit Paris to be considered the soft underbelly of the West? I don’t think so! Rather, if we intend to reason about Europe’s strategic autonomy, I believe we should do so starting from foreign policy determinations in the Mediterranean.”
- “For example, let us consider the Libyan case, where even in the recent past, before making certain choices, it would have been useful to discuss them with the EU partners,” she said, referring to France’s past role in the Libyan civil conflict.
On the EU’s approach to China. “Personally, I am convinced that those in Europe and Italy who think that we can continue to make agreements with China, as if nothing has happened and is happening in the world, are off the mark.”
- “One world has ended. Politics, geopolitics, becomes central again. This process, which we in Europe have struggled to understand, began well before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an event that undoubtedly accelerated it.”
On China’s aims. “[W]e must honestly say that China’s interest is not driven by a desire for peace between Moscow and Kyiv. Especially given that, after the initial setbacks, Beijing is benefiting from this war, also in terms of dependence on a power like Russia. So much for a peace plan! China’s interest is precisely to increase its sphere of influence.”
On Taiwan. “[W]oe betide if the West becomes divided on issues such as the protection and promotion of human rights and derogates from principles such as the self-determination of peoples. The US and Europe are the two legs of the free world: this is their strength, their strength is being the West.”
- “In the recent past we have unfortunately forgotten to define ourselves in these terms, and that was a mistake, but perhaps the scale of the conflict in Ukraine has served to remind us who we are and the games that, like it or not, we are called upon to play.”
The French President made his pro-Chinese stance explicit, just hours before the end of his visit to Beijing and while the Chinese military manoeuvered around Taiwan. What signal does all this send to the West?
Mr Macron is right when he says that Europe needs its own strategic autonomy, especially in the fields of foreign and defence policy. But this shared ambition can only be cultivated within our traditional alliances, without imagining any supposed “thirdness” or yielding to our systemic competitors of today and tomorrow. Europe and the United States, together, are the backbone of the West and – I will never cease to repeat it – represent an alliance of values before being a political, military or economic alliance. Let’s not kid ourselves: Europe needs the US and vice versa. We are inextricably linked, by the past and the future.
It is only through this alliance and through an EU that’s capable of being a true player that we will be able to meet the challenges on the horizon. They are many, they are demanding and no one can face them alone. We are at a geopolitical crossroads of epochal proportions. To divide the West, to separate even with linguistic sophistry or to give the impression of a lack of commonality of vision and intent between the US and the EU would be dramatic for everyone, especially for Europe. And then, look: if we do not want to lose ourselves in empty and stale rhetoric, we must back up declarations with facts and proposals. If Mr Macron believes that European strategic and defence autonomy is necessary, as a first step towards achieving this goal he could make Paris’ permanent seat at the UN available to the EU.
Is Mr Macron in danger of having, from now on, a hybrid position within NATO – same as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan?
I don’t think so, also in light of the clarifications that have been officially released by the Elysée. But if this is the case, it risks not only isolating France but doing serious damage to the whole of Europe. Many theorise a new-found desire for “grandeur” on the part of France, but even this has its limits and must come to terms with reality. Could it ever suit Paris to be considered the soft underbelly of the West? I don’t think so! Rather, if we intend to reason about Europe’s strategic autonomy, I believe we should do so starting from foreign policy determinations in the Mediterranean. For example, let us consider the Libyan case, where even in the recent past, before making certain choices, it would have been useful to discuss them with the EU partners. But I am confident that, even in the light of the Quirinal Treaty, certain misunderstandings between Rome and Paris (and beyond) will not be repeated. Also because – remaining on the Libyan case – it is evident how intra-European competition has opened the doors of that country to external and destabilising actors.
What spaces are opening up for Italy after Mr Macron’s declarations, especially in the Mediterranean?
Italy has always had a history of strong Transatlantic ties, notwithstanding some dangerous lapses a few years ago. Now that we have firmly regained that posture, we will work to cement a solid relationship that we will continue to cultivate without hesitation or subalternity, with the aim of enriching the Alliance with a markedly more Mediterranean sensibility. In this sense, Italy can play an extraordinary role, both as a founding country of the EU and as a reliable and credible partner of NATO. We are fundamental to both in a complex region of the world, where important portions of the new global confrontations are played out.
For this reason, we can and must play a positive role in the common interest, not only by asking Europe and NATO for their due attention to the enlarged Mediterranean area, but also by indicating common priorities and actions to enrich their respective agendas. Our wise gaze, our ability to understand the complexity of the Mediterranean, together with our rediscovered prominence in the area, is also necessary for the US ally, which is called upon to awaken its gaze in the Indo-Pacific. The Mediterranean region is and will continue to be a strategic and central area of the world that must be approached with measure and intelligence, tackling the many existing problems while seizing the many opportunities that reside there.
In the past, Italy has not always succeeded in this. How can the trend be reversed?
Italy can aspire to have an even greater role in the Mediterranean, because the French shift towards an axis that is sometimes distant from the Atlantic one risks making Paris lose that sort of “European proconsul in the Mediterranean” position, which it also derives from the special Franco-German relationship. Besides, we can and must reverse that trend because we are Italy. We finally have a government fully legitimised by a popular vote, a legislature government that brings with it great stability, a condition that is anything but secondary in foreign and defence policy. Indeed, in the past, executive instability has often been a fragility. Moreover, this executive and its majority have equipped themselves with a strategic vision. The intention manifested at many levels and expressed by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister and, if you indulge me, also myself in my capacity as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, is to have a clear Mediterranean projection.
The role handed down to us by history and geography is one that we have implicitly abdicated for years. By losing our way in the Mediterranean, we have lost ourselves. Yet our renewed prominence in the Mediterranean would be viewed with great favour and great interest by many partners, notably the US, and almost all regional players. Today, we are called upon to regain possession of this “bridging” function, thanks in part to the human value of our diplomatic personnel and, let us not forget, of our Armed Forces, the only ones in the world capable of combining the highest professionalism with a great sense of humanity. This is demonstrated by the initiatives deployed from the Balkans to the African continent, an area that I like to call, not by chance, the deep Mediterranean.
Could Macron’s posture be a Trojan horse in the EU, also looking at the Taiwanese case?
I don’t think so. But woe betide if the West becomes divided on issues such as the protection and promotion of human rights and derogates from principles such as the self-determination of peoples. When I referred to an Alliance that is first and foremost about values, I was also referring to this. The US and Europe are the two legs of the free world: this is their strength, their strength is being the West. In the recent past we have unfortunately forgotten to define ourselves in these terms, and that was a mistake, but perhaps the scale of the conflict in Ukraine has served to remind us who we are and the games that, like it or not, we are called upon to play. I am sure that President Macron and, more generally, France – in its various articulations – is fully aware of this and will take it into account in any determination.
Could this agreement weaken the European response to China’s strategic depth?
It is one thing to have trade agreements that may favour certain companies, it is quite another to have agreements that may call into question shared alliances and favour our competitors. As things stand, I do not see on the French side the idea of cultivating different game plans, especially in light of the due and timely clarifications provided after the French President’s interviews. Some of his statements, made on the return flight from a visit to China with a long discussion with President Xi Jinping – a trip in which the presence of EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was overshadowed – were certainly intemperate and lent themselves to numerous legitimate questions. Personally, I am convinced that those in Europe and Italy who think that we can continue to make agreements with China, as if nothing has happened and is happening in the world, are off the mark. One world has ended. Politics, geopolitics, becomes central again. This process, which we in Europe have struggled to understand, began well before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an event that undoubtedly accelerated it. Moreover, for the avoidance of misunderstanding, we must honestly say that China’s interest is not driven by a desire for peace between Moscow and Kyiv. Especially since after the initial setbacks, Beijing is benefiting from this war, also in terms of dependence on a power like Russia. So much for a peace plan! China’s interest is precisely to increase its sphere of influence.
