Professor Heininen will be among the protagonists of the pre-event “Greenland and Scenarios for Arctic Security,”organized by the Guarini Institute for Public Affairs of John Cabot University on March 2 at 6:00 PM. Decode39 is media partner of the initiative, which opens the Rome Forum – Polar Dialogue program and focuses on security scenarios, strategic domains and the growing interest of extra-Arctic powers in the region.
Registration for the event is available here: https://calendar.johncabot.edu/event/greenland-and-scenarios-for-arctic-security/
Q: In the context of an increasingly fragmented world order and rising tensions among major powers, how is the Arctic’s security architecture evolving, particularly in light of Russia’s military posture, China’s growing presence and NATO’s renewed focus on the High North? Is the region moving toward structured competition, managed coexistence or a new form of bloc politics?
A: Ironically, despite global disorder, antagonism in world politics, and tensions over Greenland between ‘fear’ expressed through force and ‘trust’ expressed through cooperation, the Arctic remains an exception to mainstream geopolitics. The region continues to demonstrate high geopolitical stability and has no armed conflicts.
- This stability is still based on ongoing cross-border (functional) cooperation in areas such as search and rescue, environmental protection, and science. However, due to speculation driven by constantly changing breaking news in global media and hourly updates on social media, this stability — and the reasons behind it — are rarely discussed or properly analyzed in expert debates.
- The Arctic has had no wars, armed conflicts, or sovereignty disputes since the Second World War. This situation rests, on the one hand, on specific features of Arctic security — particularly global nuclear deterrence, as both Russia and the United States deploy strategic nuclear systems in the region.
- On the other hand, it rests on specific features of Arctic governance, notably a high degree of international legal certainty. In addition, despite competition and tension, Arctic states — and partly Arctic Indigenous peoples — share common interests, including addressing long-range pollution, rapid climate change, and economic development.
- Although it is difficult to predict how long this situation will last, or how influential geopolitical blocs such as NATO or BRICS+ will become, Arctic cooperation has proven resilient.
- For example, in 2025 the eight Arctic states, forming the Arctic Council, reaffirmed their “commitment to maintaining peace, stability and cooperation in the Arctic.”
Q: To what extent will economic drivers — from new sea routes to seabed minerals and critical raw materials — redefine the Arctic’s strategic importance? Are we witnessing the early stages of a geoeconomic race comparable to other resource frontiers, or will environmental, legal and governance constraints slow exploitation?
A: This is a real issue and, in the long term, both geostrategically and environmentally significant. The Arctic has already been deeply integrated into the global resource-based economy, which operates within a political and economic culture of continuous resource extraction and competition.
- If growing global energy demand continues to be met by fossil fuels, this will accelerate the melting of Arctic ice and glaciers. Paradoxically, this makes access to Arctic resources and their transportation easier and more attractive.
- This cumulative dynamic — the “Arctic Paradox” — leads to increased exploitation of hydrocarbons and strategic minerals, as well as expanded maritime transport across the Arctic Ocean.
- Whenever policymakers attempt to balance environmental protection with increased economic activity for regional Arctic development, a structural ambivalence emerges.
- This is largely due to insufficiently strict environmental regulations and the political reluctance of Arctic states to take difficult decisions.
- At the same time, the Arctic could play a dual role: first, as an early warning system for global climate change — like a canary in a coal mine — and second, as a laboratory for transdisciplinary research on climate, human security, and environmental security.
Q: What meaningful role can middle powers and non-Arctic states — geographically distant but historically engaged in the region, such as Italy — play in the future governance of the Arctic? Can science diplomacy, industrial partnerships and multilateral frameworks allow them to shape outcomes despite not being primary actors?
A: As noted earlier, the Arctic has both a growing need and political space for international actors that actively support climate change mitigation and uphold the freedom of scientific research. Although the legally binding 2017 Arctic Science Agreement provides a framework for such cooperation, its implementation has faced hesitation.
- Small and middle-sized non-Arctic states are well positioned to contribute because they do not carry the direct burden of Arctic sovereignty claims or the need to defend immediate territorial interests.
- If they are genuinely interested in the future of the Arctic and its peoples — even though the Arctic is not legally classified as a global commons — they can act internationally, and even in planetary terms, in ways that states traditionally acted nationally.
- Existing multilateral frameworks — such as the Arctic Council and its Working Groups, the International Arctic Science Committee, and the International Polar Year — provide institutional avenues for engagement.
- However, meaningful participation requires respect for Arctic peoples and ecosystems. Science diplomacy remains a practical and effective tool for such engagement, even amid broader geopolitical turbulence.
