Two visits to Rome, days apart, capture a shift that Italy’s industrial system is only beginning to internalize. On April 15, Volodymyr Zelensky met Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to advance defence cooperation. On April 22, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski joined Antonio Tajani for the Italy–Poland Strategic Forum. Different formats, same message: Eastern Europe is no longer a periphery but rather the frontline of Europe’s security and an increasingly relevant industrial hub.
The Ukrainian track is the most immediate. No formal MoU was signed during Zelensky’s visit, but the direction is clear. Rome and Kyiv agreed to move forward on a joint “drone deal”. The framework goes beyond procurement. Ukraine is offering integration of its battlefield capabilities in drones, electronic warfare, missile defence and real-time data systems with partner industrial bases.
After years of high-intensity war, Ukraine has developed operational expertise at scale, particularly in low-cost drones and adaptive defence production cycles. This is battle-proven capability, refined under continuous pressure. Cooperation is therefore shifting from support to industrial complementarity, where Italian manufacturing depth can meet Ukrainian operational innovation.
The Polish track is more institutional, but equally relevant. In Rome, Tajani and Sikorski signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen political coordination and strategic cooperation across EU, NATO and UN frameworks, with a strong economic and defence component.
Poland, like other Eastern partners, brings a different type of asset. Exposure to sustained pressure has translated into capabilities in cyber defence, hybrid threat mitigation and institutional resilience. This includes structured training and governance models to counter foreign information manipulation and interference, areas where frontline experience has been rapidly codified and is now being exported.
For Italy, this intersects directly with the debate on industrial reconversion. Defence is no longer limited to national champions such as Leonardo or Fincantieri. The opportunity sits across the value chain: precision mechanics, automotive suppliers, electronics, software, advanced materials. Many SMEs that previously served civilian manufacturing can reposition into dual-use and defence production, accessing both strategic relevance and new revenue streams.
In practical terms, this shift is already reaching the factory floor. A small polymer firm once focused on automotive may now be asking whether its materials can be adapted for drone structures or rifle components. Similar questions are emerging across the industrial base, often without clear answers yet, but with a growing awareness that demand is moving in that direction.
Across Europe, defence spending is structurally increasing, with several countries moving beyond NATO’s 2% threshold. Poland is already above 4% of GDP, while EU-level initiatives are accelerating joint procurement and industrial capacity expansion.
Political developments are reinforcing this opening. Hungary’s recent elections have contributed to unlocking both EU financial support for Ukraine and previously frozen funds for Budapest. This reactivates capital flows in Central Europe, with Hungary once again positioned as a manufacturing and logistics hub. For Italian firms, this means renewed access to a regional ecosystem where infrastructure, energy and industrial projects are set to expand.
The shift is not limited to manufacturing, as cyber and digital capabilities are becoming central. The Tallinn Mechanism, launched in 2023 to coordinate cyber support to Ukraine, now includes 15 members. Italy joined in 2024 and is set to assume the rotating presidency in July 2026. This creates an opportunity to project national strengths in areas such as AI governance and digital capacity building in the wider Mediterranean.
These priorities align with existing European and Italian initiatives. The implementation of the EU AI Act, with obligations for high-risk systems entering into force from August 2026, opens a regulatory and industrial niche. At the same time, Italy’s Digital Flagship with Africa under the Mattei Plan connects cyber capacity building with foreign policy and development strategy.
Eastern Europe has absorbed the shock of the Russian offensive and has translated it into marketable insight, knowing capitals in Europe will compete to obtain privileged access. Italy can and should offer its industrial base and depth now, understanding that the invitation to contribute will not be open forever and to everybody. The opportunity is concrete and win reach but will not self-realize without a coordinated diplomatic and industrial policy.
Investors should also look favorably on a similar reconversion: Italy’s SMEs can generate a flywheel effect to Eastern partners’ knowhow and production, which already sees fast-growing demand and will likely deliver value for those positioned early enough to capture it.
