Defense

Is Italy really spending too much on defense? The numbers say otherwise

Italy’s defense budget is rising, sparking debate about excessive spending. However, compared to other European countries, Italy’s spending remains relatively low, highlighting the need to balance security investments with other public services

Italy’s defense budget is rising, feeding a familiar domestic debate over whether military spending is becoming excessive. A comparison with other major European countries, however, tells a different story — while recent energy and maritime crises show that underinvestment in security carries costs of its own.

By the numbers: Italy is expected to spend around $57 billion on defense in 2026, compared with roughly $147 billion for Germany, more than $110 billion for the United Kingdom and almost $80 billion for France.

  • The gap remains visible when spending is measured against GDP. Italy stands at around 2.1%, below Germany’s 2.69% and far behind Poland’s 4.68%. On a per capita basis, Italy also remains below several European allies, including Greece.
  • That does not mean Italian defense spending has stood still. Between 2014 and 2024, it increased by more than 40% in real terms, while Rome has now reached NATO’s 2% benchmark.

Why it matters: The debate often presents defense expenditure as money that could simply be redirected toward healthcare, education or other public services.

  • Budget rules are more complicated. On November 9, the EU Council activated the national escape clause for Italy, allowing additional fiscal flexibility specifically for higher defense expenditure and measures to strengthen energy security. The mechanism does not amount to a general suspension of fiscal constraints.
  • The question is therefore not only how much Italy spends, but what risks that spending is intended to mitigate.

The hidden bill: Recent crises illustrate the economic price of strategic vulnerability.

  • In 2022, amid the energy shock following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Italy’s deficit in energy trade more than doubled from €48.4 billion to €111.3 billion. Not all of that increase can be attributed directly to the war, but it demonstrated the exposure created by dependence on external energy supplies.
  • The 2026 Middle East crisis offered another example. Before the disruption, the Strait of Hormuz carried almost 20% of global LNG supply, and interruptions pushed European and Asian gas prices sharply higher.
  • Similar vulnerabilities affect maritime trade through the Red Sea, critical infrastructure and increasingly the cyber domain.

The bigger picture: More defense spending cannot guarantee that wars, energy crises or hybrid attacks will be prevented. Nor can higher Italian budgets alone determine the course of conflicts beyond Europe.

  • But military capability also shapes deterrence and political leverage. A Europe with stronger capabilities would have more instruments available when its economic and security interests are directly affected.

What it signals: The real choice is therefore not between spending on defense and spending nothing. It is between different kinds of costs.

  • Security requires resources, but dependence, disrupted trade, energy shocks and insufficient deterrence also generate bills — often less visible in public budgets, but ultimately borne by governments, businesses and citizens.

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