Home » Between Trump and NATO, a southern opening for Turkey and Italy
News

Between Trump and NATO, a southern opening for Turkey and Italy

U.S. pressure on NATO reflects a broader strategic shift, increasingly shared within the Republican establishment. In this context, the center of gravity is moving south — and Italy has an opportunity to play a key role, between Turkey, the Gulf, and a multilateral initiative.

After the joint U.S.-Israeli strike against Iran, Donald Trump has once again launched a frontal attack on NATO, openly raising the possibility of a U.S. disengagement from the Alliance. The tone is familiar: allies labeled “cowards,” accused of failing to support American efforts — particularly in refusing to grant basing and overflight rights in a sensitive operational context linked to the confrontation with the Islamic Republic.

Washington raises the pressure. That confrontation has already produced tangible effects, including the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz — a critical chokepoint for global energy flows, including supplies destined for NATO countries.

  • The key development, however, is that criticism of the Alliance is no longer confined to Trump alone. It is consolidating within the Republican establishment.

From rhetoric to strategic debate. Leading figures — from Mike Pompeo to Victoria Coates and Keith Kellogg — are contributing to a more critical reassessment of NATO, signaling a deeper shift in U.S. strategic thinking.

  • The issue is not direct military burden-sharing. It is operational reliability.
  • If access to bases is denied at critical moments, the argument emerging in Washington is that NATO risks becoming a one-way arrangement — with the United States providing security without receiving adequate operational return.

Constraints on a U.S. exit. Despite the rhetorical escalation, a U.S. withdrawal from NATO remains unlikely in the short term. Domestic legal constraints — reinforced by legislation passed in 2024 — make such a move procedurally complex, requiring congressional involvement and qualified majorities.

  • More importantly, the strategic implications are profound. U.S. contributions in command and control, intelligence, and nuclear deterrence remain difficult for European allies to replace.

The Turkey factor. The instrumental — rather than structural — nature of U.S. pressure becomes clearer when considering Turkey.

  • The next NATO summit will take place on July 7–8, 2026 in Turchia, at a time of heightened regional instability. In this context, Washington has no interest in putting Ankara under pressure.
  • Turkey is a central actor across multiple dossiers — from the Middle East to the Black Sea, as well as in regional crisis management. For this reason, while the United States may increase pressure on European allies, it cannot afford to undermine the broader balance of the Alliance ahead of such a critical summit.
  • Put simply: Trump is unlikely to want to hand Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the political weight of hosting a NATO summit without the United States.

A southern repositioning. The issue, therefore, is not a breakdown of NATO, but its redefinition.

  • The strategic center of gravity is shifting — from the eastern flank, shaped by the war in Ukraine, toward the southern arc, following Indo-Mediterranean routes.
    • The military crisis with Iran is accelerating this transition, forcing a reassessment of operational priorities and burden-sharing within the Alliance.

Italy’s diplomatic move. This is where Italy enters the picture.

  • At the diplomatic level, a parallel initiative is taking shape at the United Nations. France is advising Bahrein on a draft UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which would authorize the use of force to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and ensure the security of global energy flows.
  • Italy is working to support this proposal, while also promoting it within a broader European framework.

A Rome–Ankara–Gulf axis. This approach fits into a broader southern strategy, with Rome engaging both Ankara — as a key European partner — and Gulf countries.

  • In this context, a Rome–Turkey–Gulf axis could emerge as a concrete platform to respond to U.S. demands for greater allied responsibility, but through a multilateral and politically sustainable framework.
  • The objective is not to align automatically with Washington, but to help structure a response that integrates security, diplomacy, and regional stability.

The opportunity for Italy. In this sense, U.S. pressure on NATO does not signal an imminent disengagement, but rather an attempt to redefine the Alliance’s priorities.

  • For Italy, this creates a window of opportunity: to turn transatlantic tension into strategic relevance, helping shape a coordinated response on the southern flank — in a context that increasingly extends beyond the traditional boundaries of the Euro-Atlantic space.

Subscribe to our newsletter