A new and rather unexpected twist in the Ukraine negotiation process has emerged from a direction few anticipated. Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that “the end of the war is near” and signaled openness to meeting his Ukrainian counterpart. But could what appears to be a turning point simply be another communications trap orchestrated by the Kremlin?
Answering Decode39’s questions on the issue is Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti, senior research fellow at the Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia Center of the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI).
Q: How do you interpret these openings? Is this a “sincere” move aimed at achieving a breakthrough, or a calculated diplomatic tactic?
A: It is not easy to understand. On the one hand, it does seem to be a fairly significant opening, because until now Putin had never said he was willing to meet Volodymyr Zelensky. On the contrary, he had consistently sought to delegitimize him as a leader — first by portraying him as a Nazi puppet of the West, then by questioning his legitimacy due to the suspension of elections in Ukraine and what Moscow described as a lack of popular legitimacy.
- So yes, it appears to be a step forward. But caution is needed.
Q: What should observers be watching closely?
A: The key lies in the caveat used by Putin, which somewhat softens the significance of the opening. Putin said he was ready to meet Zelensky in a neutral country, but only to sign an agreement capable of resolving the “root causes” of the conflict — a formula the Russians have repeatedly used throughout this negotiation process. Essentially, it refers to an agreement that would amount to a substantial capitulation by Kyiv.
- That considerably scales back Putin’s concession, which for now remains only on paper and still needs to be tested against reality. And the reality so far is that Russia has shown very limited willingness to compromise.
- I would therefore advise maintaining the usual skepticism that, unfortunately, we have learned to exercise when dealing with Russia, especially in this context.
Q: The choice of Gerhard Schröder is clearly not accidental. Is it a provocation or the first real step toward a negotiating framework?
A: It is certainly not surprising. But it is also clearly a choice that cannot be acceptable to the European Union and to the West more broadly.
- Frankly, I would not have expected someone like Emmanuel Macron, but rather perhaps Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has already played a relevant role in negotiations in the past and whose involvement could genuinely have represented a realistic starting point.
- Schröder, on the other hand, seems difficult to imagine in such a role. There has also been speculation about Angela Merkel, but I am not sure to what extent she would be willing to step back into the field in this capacity. Nor am I convinced that she is truly appreciated by the Kremlin, despite the narrative surrounding the appeasement that supposedly characterized her Russia policy. In reality, tensions with the Kremlin during her tenure were always very real.
Q: If this is indeed a “sincere” move, the lack of tangible progress on the battlefield and growing domestic discontent — recently exacerbated by the Kremlin’s tightening control over the internet — are certainly factors. How do you read the mood within Russian society?
A: The temperature is lukewarm, but not boiling.
- There is certainly internal dissatisfaction, generated both by these viral videos from influencers and by the lack of meaningful progress on the battlefield, as well as by economic difficulties. These are all objective realities.
- But I do not believe they are enough to push Putin toward making concessions in this conflict. I would not say that public opinion is irrelevant — even in authoritarian systems, public sentiment still matters to some extent. However, in this case, Putin’s objectives remain maximalist despite circumstances that are certainly far from favorable for Russia.
