The news, first reported by Decode39/Formiche.net, that Italy’s parliamentary intelligence oversight committee (Copasir) is preparing to launch a new investigation into Chinese investments in Italy — given their not always benign nature — has brought back to the forefront a debate that had already been regaining momentum in recent months.
Put simply: if Italy and Europe once again need to guard themselves against the Dragon, what is the best way to do so? And, perhaps more importantly, has the Chinese challenge already expanded well beyond traditional strategic sectors? Decode39 discussed these questions with Antonio Teti, professor of Cybersecurity Fundamentals at the “G. D’Annunzio” University of Chieti-Pescara.
Q: Seven years after its previous investigation, Copasir is once again preparing to scrutinise Chinese investments in Italy. What explains this decision?
A: Copasir’s decision is not only appropriate, but necessary. Around seven years after parliamentary attention first focused on Chinese penetration of 5G networks, the strategic landscape has profoundly changed. Today, the issue is no longer limited to telecommunications, but concerns the entire perimeter of national technological sovereignty.
- According to initial reports, the new inquiry will focus on startups, the protection of know-how, technology and Chinese investments in sensitive sectors. The central point is that foreign investments can no longer be assessed exclusively through economic or financial categories.
Q: What do you mean by that?
A: Let me explain. We must ask what exactly is being acquired, by whom, for what purpose, through which corporate structures and with what consequences for national security. A small startup developing artificial intelligence algorithms, sensor systems, quantum technologies, robotics, semiconductors, encryption software or dual-use applications may now possess greater strategic value than traditional infrastructure assets.
- China, for example, does not operate according to the clear separation between public and private sectors typical of Western liberal democracies. As I explained in my recent book China Intelligence: Techniques, Tools and Methodologies of Espionage and Counterintelligence in the People’s Republic of China, many formally private companies operate within an ecosystem in which the state, the Communist Party, industry, academia, scientific research and intelligence services are deeply interconnected.
- This creates a scenario in which an apparently commercial investment may generate long-term informational, technological, military and geopolitical effects.
Q: And this is where the Italian state — and Copasir — comes into play.
A: Exactly. Copasir is right to focus on three key aspects: protecting national know-how, reducing vulnerabilities in strategic supply chains and preventing foreign capital from becoming an instrument of influence. This is not about demonising China. It is about recognising that national security today also depends on corporate governance, patents, data, algorithms and digital infrastructure.
Q: Chinese investments have often revealed a predatory dimension. Did Europe underestimate this dynamic?
A: Yes, Europe often underestimated the problem. For years, a naïve market-driven approach prevailed: if foreign capital arrived, it was automatically considered an opportunity. That logic is no longer sustainable. It also ignored a crucial point: not all investments are equal, and not all investors operate according to the same logic.
- In the Chinese case, the objective has often gone far beyond simple financial investment. It has involved acquiring know-how, patents, expertise, market access, industrial relationships, emerging technologies and data. In some cases, this amounted to a genuine strategy of technological absorption: entering the capital structure of a Western company, understanding its processes and transferring its intellectual and industrial assets elsewhere.
- Europe made a double mistake. On the one hand, it defended the openness of its markets without demanding real reciprocity. On the other, it struggled to recognise the geopolitical dimension of economics. China, by contrast, has never separated economics, industry, security and national power.
- What many still fail to understand is that, for Beijing, technology is a tool of sovereignty. For too long, Europe viewed China merely as a market opportunity, and this progressively exposed many strategic European assets — from major infrastructure to small but highly innovative companies — to vulnerability.
- The startup sector is particularly exposed because these companies often possess promising technologies but weak financial structures, making them easy acquisition targets when public or European support mechanisms are lacking. The West looked away because Chinese investment appeared convenient in the short term. But national security cannot be measured in quarterly results. It must be measured through the ability to preserve autonomy, supply chains, industrial knowledge and technological superiority.
Q: Let us attempt a first conclusion. The new Cold War is increasingly being fought through technology, cybersecurity and AI. How dangerous is China today?
A: China is one of the West’s main systemic competitors. Its challenge should not be understood purely in military terms, but above all in technological, industrial, informational and cognitive terms.
- The Chinese challenge is not confined to a single sector. It stems from the integration of multiple dimensions: cyberspace, artificial intelligence, data, infrastructure, supply chains, scientific research, digital platforms, logistics, space, energy and finance.
- China is dangerous because it possesses a persistent strategy. It thinks long term, invests massively in critical technologies and uses economics as a geopolitical lever. The West, meanwhile, often reacts in a fragmented, delayed and defensive manner.
Q: Can you give an example?
A: In artificial intelligence, for example, China benefits from enormous volumes of data, strong computational capacity, control over digital platforms and close integration between public research and private industry. These are major strategic advantages.
- In cybersecurity, the threat is no longer limited to traditional cyberattacks. It includes the ability to penetrate supply chains, software, hardware components, industrial networks and critical infrastructure.
- But the real issue is dependency. If a country depends on technologies produced, controlled or updated by an external strategic actor, its decision-making autonomy is reduced. This applies to 5G, cloud computing, batteries, inverters, surveillance systems, industrial components, AI platforms, sensors and mobility technologies.
- The risk level is extremely high — not because every Chinese product is automatically a threat, but because any technology inserted into a critical environment can become a vector of vulnerability. China becomes particularly dangerous when it combines three elements: access to data, technological control and influence over industrial governance.
Q: At this point, can we draft a sort of survival guide for the West?
A: The first step is to abandon naïveté. The West must remain open, but it cannot remain defenceless. Free markets work when actors operate under comparable rules. They become dangerous when authoritarian powers use them as instruments of strategic penetration.
- This survival guide should begin with a genuine doctrine of economic security.
- First: map strategic assets — not only large corporations, but also startups, research centres, patents, university laboratories, digital infrastructure, databases, software platforms and production chains.
- Second: identify the ultimate beneficiary of any investment. It is not enough to know which company is buying an asset; we must understand who controls that company, what links it has to the Chinese state and what role it plays in Beijing’s industrial strategy.
- Third: strengthen foreign investment screening. The European Union is moving in this direction, but greater speed, coordination and economic intelligence capabilities are still needed.
- Fourth: apply golden power mechanisms preventively, not only in emergencies. If the state intervenes only once corporate control has already consolidated, the response risks arriving too late.
- Fifth: create European financial instruments capable of protecting strategic companies.
Q: How should that work?
A: It is not enough to block acquisitions by external actors. Europe must also provide companies with alternative sources of capital, growth and internationalisation.
- Sixth: protect data. Today, the real value of many companies lies not in physical assets, but in their data, algorithms and predictive models.
- Seventh: build a national culture of economic security. Managers, universities, research centres, startups and public administrations must understand that technological partnerships may also have intelligence implications.
- The West’s survival will depend on its ability to defend openness without allowing openness itself to become a systemic vulnerability.
Q: You mentioned golden power measures. Italy has already seen the Pirelli case, and Ferretti could be next. Is this the right approach?
A: It is the correct approach, but it must be part of a broader strategy. Golden power is essential because it allows the state to intervene when a corporate operation could affect critical national security interests.
- In the Pirelli case, the Italian government imposed new restrictions to limit the influence of the Chinese group Sinochem, particularly regarding governance, access to sensitive information and the ability to shape industrial decisions.
- The case is especially significant because it no longer concerns traditional tyres, but advanced technologies such as cyber tyres — intelligent tyres capable of communicating with a vehicle’s electronic systems. Pirelli’s intention to produce these advanced tyres in the United States also reflects concerns over Chinese influence restrictions in Italy.
- This demonstrates that modern industrial technology is increasingly connected, digital and sensitive.
Q: Can the same logic applied to Pirelli also apply to Ferretti?
A: The Ferretti case fits into the same framework. According to several media reports, the luxury yacht group — which includes brands such as Riva and Pershing — has significant Chinese representation within its governance structure, prompting calls for the possible use of special powers.
- The issue is not merely formal shareholding percentages, but effective control: who appoints executives, who shapes strategic decisions, who accesses industrial information and who influences the company’s international trajectory.
- Golden power is effective when it sterilises risk — preventing foreign shareholders from influencing strategic decisions or accessing sensitive information. But it also has a structural limitation: it is usually activated only once the operation is already advanced.
- That is why it must be combined with preventive monitoring, economic intelligence activities, analysis of corporate ownership chains and public or European financial intervention capabilities.
- In short, golden power is indispensable, but it may not be sufficient when companies are already under pressure. The real objective should be to prevent them from becoming vulnerable in the first place.
Q: Chinese technology and espionage: where does the level of risk stand today?
A: The level of risk is extremely high, above all because contemporary technology is pervasive, interconnected and often invisible. We are no longer speaking only about telecoms equipment or 5G networks. We are talking about inverters, batteries, solar panels, storage systems, cameras, industrial sensors, management software, cloud platforms, algorithms, drones, port systems, logistics infrastructure, IoT devices and components embedded in critical infrastructure.
- In the renewable energy sector, for example, the issue is not only industrial dependence on Chinese components, but also the possibility that devices connected to energy networks may introduce new vulnerabilities.
- Energy grids, hospitals, payment systems, water networks and transportation systems are now deeply digitised environments. A vulnerability in the supply chain can therefore become a national security issue.
Q: So what changes?
A: The greatest danger is no longer espionage in the traditional sense. It is broader. It may involve data collection, remote access, potential sabotage, manipulation of information flows, dependency on software updates, opaque code, the inability to verify hardware components and the capacity to exert political pressure through the control of essential technologies.
- Not every Chinese technology is a threat, and claiming otherwise would be a mistake. But every technology developed within an ecosystem influenced by an authoritarian state must be evaluated according to the context in which it is deployed.
- A standard commercial device is one thing. The same device embedded within an energy network, port, power plant, healthcare infrastructure, defence system or public administration network is another matter entirely.
- Today, the risk threshold lies at the intersection of three factors: the criticality of the infrastructure, the level of connectivity and the opacity of the supplier. When those three elements converge, the risk becomes strategic.
- The West’s real challenge will be distinguishing between economic openness and systemic vulnerability. The issue is not closing ourselves off from the world, but preventing the market from becoming the gateway through which external actors gain power over our infrastructure, industries and, ultimately, our sovereignty.
